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The relationship between a buyer and its suppliers is important and often relies on factors beyond the terms
of a contractual agreement. Buyers can therefore benet from identifying trustworthy suppliers. We argue
that pre-contractual actions by the supplier, for example making costly buyer-specic investments without a
long-term contract, can signal a supplier's trustworthiness. We develop a theoretical model to reect supplier
trustworthiness, and identify when a buyer can benet from identifying trustworthy suppliers. We show that
costly relationship-specic investments can serve as a signal of trustworthiness, and that supply chain prots
increase when trustworthy suppliers are able to identify themselves in this fashion. We demonstrate the
importance of the signaling mechanism using laboratory experiments. The experimental results show that
relationship-specic investments lead to more collaborative transactions, with buyers oering higher prices
and suppliers reciprocating with higher quality goods. This results in increased prots for both buyers and
suppliers. Additionally, we show that the benet of the relationship-specic investment depends directly on
the signaling mechanism. Finally, we show that the benets of buyer-specic investments for both suppliers
and buyers are strengthened when rms interact repeatedly.
Key words : reciprocity, collaboration in supply chains, behavioral operations
1. Introduction
The relationship between a buyer and its suppliers is vital in almost every aspect of business.
The operations management literature has explored in depth the problem of designing the optimal
contracts for buyer-supplier relations. In many business contexts, however, it is not possible to
describe every important aspect of the transaction in a contract. For example, desired quality or
service level may be hard to specify (Kaya and Ozer 2009). The supplier's responses to disruptions
from unforeseen events, such as a natural disaster, may also be hard to determine. When a supplier
fails to fulll its obligations, the buying rm can suer greatly. For example, Toyota's accelerator
pedal quality problems in 2010 (due in part to supplier misbehavior) cost the company nearly two
billion dollars and a signicant decline in market share. To prevent such outcomes, many rms
1
2invest in identifying and maintaining good relationships with their business counterparts (e.g.,
suppliers, buyers).
In a supply chain setting, a relationship with a trustworthy supplier often results in signicant
benet for a buyer. Morgan and Hunt (1994) nd that when both commitment and trust are
present in the buyer-supplier relationship it leads to increased eciency, productivity and eec-
tiveness. Piboonrungorj and Disney (2012) studied supplier relationships in the tourism industry
and found that higher levels of inter-rm trust lead to better logistics performance. Doney and
Cannon (1997) empirically found a positive correlation between the buying rm's trust in a sup-
plier and the supplier's willingness to make relation-specic investments. A recent initiative by
General Motors (GM) to establish strategic supplier relationships that the authors were involved
in led to an improvement in the relationship with a key supplier of fascia, ultimately leading to the
supplier building a new dedicated production facility. Often, supplier trustworthiness is demon-
strated by the behavior of suppliers in areas not covered by the contract. Many buyers explicitly
attempt to encourage this \above and beyond" behavior. Many companies including Delphi, Veri-
zon, and AT&T have established outstanding supplier awards for the suppliers that go above and
beyond their performance objectives. They reward their suppliers' eorts in terms of creative cost-
reduction solutions, teamwork, customer service, response to natural disaster, sustainability, and
social responsibility. For instance, a major store chain, Costco, states in its ocial Supplier's Code
of Conduct that it encourages its suppliers to work to achieve above and beyond goals in excess of
legal workplace requirements.
A standard argument for the emergence of a collaborative relationship under an incomplete
contract is that long-term relationships between buyers and suppliers and concerns about reputa-
tion will limit opportunistic behavior. That is, if the expected long-term benets of good behavior
outweigh the immediate gratication of engaging in opportunistic behavior, then self-interested
suppliers will perform collaboratively even in areas where the contract is silent. While relational
and reputational incentives are certainly important, there are many cases where the incentives they
provide are absent or insucient to fully explain behavior. For example, many transactions are
dicult for outsiders to monitor so that reputational incentives can steer supplier's behavior. The
transactions may also be inherently one-time exchanges that fail to induce relational incentives. In
these cases it is important for a buyer to identify suppliers that are trustworthy before signing a
contract.
Trust can be generally dened as \a psychological state comprising the intention to accept
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another" (Rousseau
3et al. 1998) 1. In the context under study, a trusting buyer oers a generous price to a supplier when
quality is non-contractible. A trustworthy supplier provides high quality when he was trusted with
a high price. A natural question is what leads suppliers to be inherently trustworthy. We represent
inherent trustworthiness by some suppliers as those suppliers acting reciprocally: if a supplier is
treated generously by the buyers (e.g., if they are oered a high price), it will reciprocate the
gesture by, for example, providing high quality products. While reciprocity has been observed in a
number of settings among individuals, it is also a relevant characteristic in describing transactions
between rms. As Morgan and Hunt (1994) and Piboonrungorj and Disney (2012) show, rms
dier in trustworthiness and transactions between rms with higher trustworthiness benet both
parties - suggesting that trustworthiness is an intrinsic attribute that can separate rms. Why do
rms dier in trustworthiness? One possible explanation could be that rms, regardless of their
size or industry, execute their interactions with other rms through individuals. This is the case
at GM, a large company with over two hundred thousand employees, where the relationship with
each supplier is managed by a handful of people interacting with a small number of individuals
from the supplier. Thus, these individuals' preferences and behavior will inuence the relationship
that develops between the rms. Another possible explanation is that a rm's trustworthiness is a
deliberate business strategy supported by the rm's corporate culture. A rm's culture often reects
how the leadership would like employees to interact with customers and business partners. Some
rms who are known to be \excellent" suppliers may try to cultivate cultures where \above and
beyond" actions are rewarded. In such cases, reliability and trustworthiness will be more common
in their relationships with other rms.
As suppliers may inherently dier in trustworthiness, an important question for buyers is how
to identify these \good" suppliers before contracting. In this paper we propose that observing
pre-contracting behavior by the supplier is one way to discern good suppliers from selsh ones.
In particular, we argue that early buyer-specic investments by a supplier may signal that rm's
trustworthiness. Relationship-specic investments are costly for suppliers, as investing in one par-
ticular buyer will tend to weaken the supplier's outside option and make the supplier vulnerable
in negotiations with the buyer. However, these kind of relationship-specic investments are not
rare. Ganesan (1994), in a study of buyer-supplier relationship in regional department store chains,
found that transaction-specic marketing investments were quite common, including training the
retailer's salesforce, developing product displays, providing dedicated electronic linkups for inven-
tory control and oering information on new products. We found other examples through our own
1 This denition is used by Ozer et al. (2011) in their study of trust in forecast information sharing. In their context,
a trusting supplier relies on the forecast information provided by the manufacturer to make a capacity decision and
a trustworthy supplier is that who reports forecast information truthfully.
4professional interaction with rms. Cosmax, an original design manufacturer which serves several
of the world's largest cosmetics companies, invested in a buyer-specic equipment which, at the
time, was only recommended by L'Oreal without even having a contract from L'Oreal. An Argen-
tinean clothing manufacturer, Kayene, hired a dedicated quality assurance team to serve a specic
retailer prior to having an agreement or a written contract with that rm.2 In both cases it was
feasible for the rms to make these investments after securing the contract. Why then would these
rms make the costly investments in advance? We hypothesize that these kind of investments can
be used as signals that trustworthy suppliers send to help the buying rm to discern trustworthy
suppliers from selsh suppliers. While Cosmax anticipated that building trust with L'Oreal would
lead to a long term relationship, in the case of Kayene the buying rm's objectives were focused
mainly on the short run due the high volatility of the Argentinean economy, which makes future
interactions highly unpredictable.
These motivations suggest several research questions that we address in this paper: What are
the benets of developing a more collaborative supplier relationship? Is it possible to identify
trustworthy suppliers before contracting with them? If so, under what circumstances is it possible?
Do these benets persist in long term relationships? We hypothesize that the buyer can distinguish
between trustworthy and untrustworthy suppliers based on the suppliers pre-contract investments.
Specically, we expect that suppliers who make a buyer-specic investment will be more likely to
deliver higher non-contractible quality, leading to higher prots for both rms. These results should
be further accentuated when rms have expectations of establishing a long term relationship.
To formalize this intuition, we develop a model in which a trustworthy supplier can make a
relationship-specic investment (instead of a general investment) to signal his type to the buyer.
The buyer then oers a price, and the supplier makes a non-contractible eort that determines
product quality. We identify cases where a trustworthy supplier chooses the buyer-specic invest-
ment while the selsh supplier chooses the general investment in a separating equilibrium. Under
this equilibrium trustworthy suppliers receive higher prices, and exert higher eort.
We test these predictions using an experimental supply chain game. Our results show that the
specic investment leads to signicantly higher prices and quality, and increases the prots for
both the buyer and the supplier. Furthermore, the investment choice reects persistent individual
dierences, with dierent subjects showing a preference for one investment over another. We show
that there is a positive correlation between the suppliers' preference for the specic investment
and their level of reciprocity. Hence, the investment choice represents an accurate signal of the
underlying type of the supplier. We demonstrate that the signaling mechanism is essential in
2 The authors worked with Cosmax and Kayene for several years.
5generating the benets of the specic investment. In additional treatments where the signaling
mechanism is limited (by reducing the eciency of the specic investment) or eliminated (by
randomly assigning investments), the buyer specic investment no longer leads to higher quality
or increased prots.
Finally, we analyze the case where rms interact repeatedly through several transactions after the
supplier's investment decision, representing a (nite) long-term relationship between the buyer and
the supplier. In the absence of reciprocal suppliers, equilibria with collaborative outcomes can never
be supported with nitely repeated interactions. However, in the presence of reciprocal suppliers,
we characterize two equilibria where buyers oer positive prices and suppliers oer positive eort,
resulting in higher total prots. First, as with the one-shot interaction, an equilibrium exists where
a reciprocal supplier chooses the specic investment and a selsh supplier chooses the general
investment. In another collaborative equilibrium, the selsh supplier mimics the reciprocal suppliers
by choosing the specic investment and oering high quality in all transactions except the last
one. In both equilibria the specic investment generates higher eort and a greater surplus that
the general investment, and, compared to the one-transaction game, the benets of the specic
investment over the general investment are magnied by the repeated interactions. To test these
results, we conducted a new treatment with one investment decision and three subsequent trading
periods. We nd that three trading periods are enough to signicantly increase the eciency of
the specic investment. Prices and eort under the specic investment are signicantly higher
than in the single interaction case. As a result, the prot premiums of the specic investment are
signicantly more prominent with repeated interactions for both buyers and suppliers.
2. Literature Survey
Improving buyer-supplier relations can lead to important performance gains, including enhanced
supply-chain responsiveness (as a result of reduced cycle times) and higher prots (Handeld and
Bechtel 2002). Additionally, these relationships can benet from the parties' willingness to make
relationship-specic investments (Dyer and Singh 1998). For example, Asanuma (1989) and Dyer
(1996) have shown that rms can derive improved performance and competitive advantages when
relationship-specic investments were made. However, relationship specic investments also present
problems. Hold-up problems arise from the fact that, once a party has made a specic investment,
the other party has an incentive to be opportunistic. In many cases it is dicult to prevent such
opportunism contractually, which may necessitate vertical integration to promote eciency (see
Williamson 1971, Williamson 1975, Klein et al. 1978, Williamson 1979, and Grossman and Hart
1986 for theoretical work; see Monteverde and Teece 1982, Masten 1984, and Joskow 1985 for
empirical work).
6Alternative mechanisms that can limit the scope for opportunism are long run relationships and
the importance of rm reputation (Larson 1992, Baker et al. 2002, Gibbons 2005). There is experi-
mental evidence of this in the Operations Management literature. Ozer et al. (2011) nd that trust
and cooperation can be reinforced by reputation concerns in the context of forecast information
sharing. Heinrich and Brosig-Koch (2011) nd that when buyers can consider the reputation of
bidders in procurement auctions, bidders supply higher quality leading to higher market eciencies
3. We consider rst a setting where complete contracting, integration and relational incentives are
not present to provide clear and direct evidence for the importance of trustworthiness. Our results
also apply to settings where these factors may be present, but insucient to incentivize proper
behavior by the supplier. Then, we consider the case where rms interact repeated times. This
allows us to examine the role of reputation concerns on trust in the context of relationship-specic
investments with hold up problems.
The importance of trust and trustworthiness has been demonstrated in a variety of settings. Berg
et al. (1995) provide early experimental evidence on the importance of trust and trustworthiness in
investment decisions. Glaeser et al. (2000) demonstrate that trust and trustworthiness reects both
past actions and beliefs about others. Kosfeld et al. (2005) show that trust has a biological basis.
Trust varies between countries (Bohnet et al. 2008), often depending on culture and institutions
(Bohnet et al. 2001, Johnson et al. 2002). The level of trust in a country has signicant eects
on the rate of economic growth (Zak and Knack 2001), as many economic transactions require
trusting the other party.
Trustworthiness is often modeled as a preference for equity or reciprocity (Rabin 1993, Fehr
and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004), an approach
that we follow. King-Casas et al. (2005) demonstrate that reciprocal actions lead to future trust
and trustworthiness. Reciprocal motives have been demonstrated experimentally in a labor mar-
ket setting where higher wages lead to higher eort (Fehr and Falk 1999), and a buyer-seller
transaction setting where higher prices lead to higher quality goods (Fehr et al. 1993). Mutual
reciprocity/trustworthiness (as in our setting) is a particularly powerful way of addressing prob-
lems of contractual incompleteness (Fehr et al. 1997). Since reciprocal counterparties are more
protable, it is a natural question how one might identify a reciprocal individual from a selsh one.
A few studies have looked at signals from outside the transaction, such as the image of the other
person's face (Scharlemann et al. 2001) or information about past charitable giving (Fehrler 2010).
3More recent research by Haruvey, Katok, Ma and Sethi (2014) also focuses on the eects of reputation on the
provision of quality. They conduct an experimental study of the role of reputation building when a seller makes
non-contractible eort towards the production of a good.
7This paper, however, focuses on the role of investments within the context of the transaction as a
potential signal of trustworthiness.
The eld of Operations Management has produced a vast literature on buyer-supplier relation-
ships. Most papers in this category focus on designing optimal contracts or comparing contracts in
dierent settings. This attention towards contracting problems stems from the challenge of coordi-
nating each rm's objective with that of the supply chain, particularly due to double marginaliza-
tion (Cachon 2003, Spengler 1950). The most usual setting for these problems is the newsvendor
model (Silver et al. 1998) for which dierent types of contracts have been explored, including whole-
sale price (Lariviere and Porteus 2001, Bresnahan and Reiss 1985), buy-back (Pasternack 1985)
and revenue sharing contracts (Cachon and Lariviere 2005). Rather than investigating the quan-
tity decision, we focus on non-contractible aspects of buyer-supplier relations such as eort and
quality. While other have studied incentive problems relating to non-contractible capacity invest-
ments (Tomlin 2003) or product quality (Kaya and Ozer 2009) we are unaware of other papers
that examine investment as a signaling mechanism in this context.
In the behavioral operations literature, contracting theories in buyer-supplier interactions have
been tested experimentally and revised to account for social preferences or decision biases, begin-
ning with Schweitzer and Cachon (2000).4 Several papers have identied concerns for fairness as
an important inuence on supply chain performance (Cui et al. 2007, Pavlov and Katok 2009). A
recent paper by Ozer et al. (2011) studies the importance of trust and trustworthiness in sharing
forecast information within a supply chain. Loch and Wu (2008) nd that forming a relationship
prior to a transaction leads both parties to take more collaborative actions. Cui and Mallucci
(2010) study how investment decisions are aected when the retailer can have distributive fair-
ness concerns with respect to the manufacturer. We identify a specic action that buyers can take
beforehand which can lead to more collaborative relationships. We model a situation where the
supplier can signal its type by making a relationship-specic investment before the buyer oers
a contract and propose that this signal allows the buyer to screen for reciprocal suppliers, which
turns out into a more collaborative and protable relationship between the parties.
3. Theoretical Model
We consider a three-stage game in which a buyer trades with a single supplier for a non-divisible
good. In the rst stage the supplier makes a pre-contractual investment. The buyer observes this
and oers a take-it-or-leave-it price oer in the second stage. Then, the supplier decides if he should
accept the oer, and, if so, how much eort he will exert towards generating quality. The buyer's
4 See also Bolton and Katok (2008), Becker-Peth et al. (2011), Katok and Wu (2009) and Ho and Zhang (2008).
8value of the good depends on the good's quality, which depends on the supplier's non-contractible
eort and his investment choice.
At the beginning of the game, the supplier needs to choose between two dierent investment
options: a general investment (denoted by g) and a buyer-specic investment (denoted by b). We
assume that the rm has the resources available to make one investment, and that either investment
would be a better use of capital than the alternatives - hence choosing one investment is the
optimal decision.5. Both options have equal nancial cost, however they benet the supplier in
dierent ways. The general investment directly increases the supplier's the outside option value
(i.e., the reservation utility) which is the monetary value the supplier receives when both parties
cannot strike a deal. Since the buyer has to compensate at least the outside option value in order
to close a deal, the general investment benets the supplier by improving the supplier's bargaining
power. Examples of the general investment include industry standard certication (e.g., ISO 9000),
building a multi-purpose automated production line, and increasing the capability and man-power
in B2B marketing. On the other hand, the buyer-specic investment will increase the value of the
good for the buyer for a given eort choice of supplier. This investment will benet the supplier
only if the buyer shares the increased value created by the supplier's investment and eort through
the take-it-or-leave-it price. Examples of the buyer-specic investment include purchasing a buyer-
specic machine or xture, adopting a higher quality standard that is only requested by a particular
buyer, or hiring a team for a specic buyer. Note that we are considering the case where the
supplier is already about to make an investment since making either one of the investments is
protable (better than not investing at all). Thus, the supplier has already incurred in the initial
cost of investing, which will be considered sunk cost. However, since the supplier can only choose
one investment, the buyer-specic investment has an opportunity cost - the supplier must forgo
the chance to increase the his outside option.
To formally capture this, we assume that, if the supplier chooses investment i (i= g; or b) and
exerts eort, e, the value of the good the buyer receives is ie where b >g > 0. In other words, for
given eort level, e, the supplier who chose the buyer-specic investment provides a higher quality,
and hence a higher value to the buyer, (be) than the supplier who chose the general investment
5We considered an alternative model where the supplier makes a decision i from two options: to invest (i= I) or not
to invest (i=NI). If he invests, the quality coecient is I and if he does not invest it is NI , with I >NI > 0.
Under both decisions the outside option remains uI = uNI = u > 0 and making the investment has a xed cost K.
We assume in this case, that a reciprocal supplier considers an oer to be generous if the price not only compensates
him for his outside option but also for his investment cost, K. We nd that there is no set of parameters under
which a Separating Equilibrium can arise in this model. In particular, the interesting Separating Equilibrium in which
the selsh supplier chooses not to invest and the reciprocal supplier chooses to make the specic investment cannot
happen. This is because it is never incentive compatible for the selsh supplier not to invest for two reasons: rst,
because the price oered to suppliers who invest is too high since it needs to compensate for K, and second, not
investing does not raise the supplier's outside option.
9(ge). We will refer to i as the quality coecient from now onwards. We assume that the outside
option value from the general investment (ug) is higher than that from the specic investment (ub):
ug > ub  0.
After observing the supplier's investment, the buyer oers a take-it-or-leave-it price contract, p,
to a supplier. In the nal stage of the game, the supplier evaluates the contract and determines
whether to accept the buyer's oer or not. If the supplier rejects the buyer's oer, the buyer receives
zero payo and the supplier receives the outside option value (ug or ub), depending on the supplier's
pre-contract investment. If the supplier accepts the contract, the supplier then chooses an eort
level, e, which incurs cost c(e), which we assume to be strictly increasing and strictly convex in e.
We assume that there are two types of suppliers{selsh and reciprocal{ in the market place,
where reciprocity reects inherent trustworthiness of the supplier. The selsh supplier cares about
his own monetary payo exclusively. Thus, he only aims to maximize its own prot. If the selsh
supplier with investment type i accepts the buyer's contract (p) and chooses eort level e, his
utility is simply his monetary payo and is dened as follows
U s(eji; p) = p  c(e): (1)
When oered a contract, the selsh supplier will compare the maximum utility he can receive from
accepting the buyer's oer to his outside option (ui), and will choose the option that yields a higher
monetary payo.
On the other hand, if the buyer's oer is suciently generous, the reciprocal supplier's utility
depends on both total supply chain prots as well as his own monetary payo. To capture this, let
 > 0 be the minimum premium that the reciprocal supplier needs to receive in order to perceive
that the buyer's oer is generous. If the buyer's oer to the supplier with investment type i is not
generous, that is, p <  + ui, then the reciprocal supplier will act selshly and will maximize his
monetary payo, p  c(e). On the other hand, if the buyer's oer, p, is generous, then the supplier
with investment i who accepts the contract will maximize a utility function that accounts for both
his monetary payo and the total surplus of the supply chain: (1  )[p  c(e)] + [ie  c(e)] for
some  2 [0;1]. We dene  to be the coecient of reciprocity, which represents the degree of
the supplier's reciprocity toward the buyer. Note than when = 0, then this payo is identical to
that of the selsh supplier. On the other hand, when = 1, the supplier becomes totally altruistic
and interested in maximizing the total surplus. Thus, the higher  is, the more reciprocal the
supplier is. This notion of reciprocity is similar in spirit to perceived kindness used in Rabin (1993)
in simultaneous move games, and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher
(2006) in sequential games, or inequity aversion used in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). However, our
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model is a stylized simplication of other models of reciprocity in two respects. First, our reciprocal
supplier cares about total surplus, rather than the buyer's prot. Surplus maximization is more
intuitive and prevents inecient over-provision of quality, which in the context of buyer-supplier
relations would be unrealistic. 6 Second, reciprocity is binary, depending on whether the oer is
suciently generous. 7
Combining these two cases, the utility that the reciprocal supplier with investment i gains when
he accepts the buyer's price oer, p and exerts an eort level, e is
U r(eji; p) =

p  c(e) if p  ui <
(1 )(p  c(e))+(ie  c(e)) if p  ui   (2)
The supplier compares the maximum utility that he can receive from accepting the oer and the
outside option (ui), and chooses the option with a higher value.
The buyer's utility from oering a price, p to the supplier with investment type i (i= b or g) is 8
UB(pje; i) =

ie  p if the supplier accepts the oer and exert an eort level, e
0 if the supplier rejects the oer.
(3)
We rst study the full information case, in which the supplier's type is common knowledge and
we then study the case where the supplier's type is private information.
3.1. Full Information Case
We begin by analyzing the case where the buyer has full information about the supplier type {
reciprocal or selsh{ as a benchmark. We rst characterize the supplier's action in the third stage:
whether the supplier should accept the buyer's oer and, if so, how much eort he should exert.
We then apply backward induction and analyze the buyer's oer problem (2nd stage) and the
supplier's choice of pre-contractual investment (1st stage).
In the third stage, a supplier decides between accepting the buyer's oer and rejecting the oer
for an outside option. If the supplier accepts the oer, he must decide how much eort he exerts.
We rst consider a selsh supplier who chose type-i investment in the rst stage and received the
6 If the surplus is replaced by buyer's prot (with the adjustment that the reciprocity coecient, , needs to range
between [0; 1
2
]) behavior does not change.
7 This simplication provides modeling tractability, however none of our main results depend on this assumption.
The assumption is similar to that in Englmaier and Leider (2012) where, in a principal-agent context, a \generous"
contract is one that provides the agent with an expected monetary utility in excess of his outside option. We consider a
binary version of that model and introduce the additional individual-specic parameter , which reects how generous
the oer needs to be.
8We consider the simpler case where the buyer is modeled as selsh, which is sucient to derive separating equilibrium
results. Because the supplier moves last, if the supplier is reciprocal then even a selsh buyer has strategic reasons to
oer a high price. A reciprocal buyer would have an even greater incentive to oer high prices to suppliers choosing
the specic investment, strengthening our results. This setting is similar to Englmaier and Leider (2012) where, in a
principal-agent context, the agent is modeled as reciprocal and the principal as selsh when solving for the optimal
contract.
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buyer's oer, p. If he rejects the oer, then he would receive the utility from his outside option, ui.
If he accepts the oer, from (1), it is easy to observe that the optimal eort for the selsh supplier
is always zero regardless of the price, p.
Now, consider a reciprocal supplier with type-i investment. As in the selsh supplier case, if
the reciprocal supplier rejects the oer, he earns his outside option, ui. On the other hand, if he
accepts, his optimal eort depends on whether he perceives the buyer's contract to be generous.
If p u< , then the oer is not considered to be generous. Thus, the supplier will act selsh and
will maximize the utility function, p  c(e) by exerting zero eort. If p  u , then the supplier
nds the oer generous. Then, his best eort is derived from the following optimization problem:
max
e0
(1 )(p  c(e))+(ie  c(e)) s.t. p  ui  :
The solution to this problem is c0(e) = i. Note that, because c(e) is a strictly increasing convex
function of e, c0(e) is always positive, increasing in e, and invertible. Additionally, since c0(e) is
strictly increasing in e, c0 1(i) is also increasing. As a result, the solution to the above problem
can also be written as er(p; i) = c0 1(i). After combining both cases, it can be shown that the
reciprocal supplier's optimal eort, denoted by er(p; e^; i), is
er(p; i) =

0 if p < ui+ 
c0 1(i) otherwise.
(4)
We then compare the two options{ accepting and rejecting{ and characterize the supplier's
optimal action in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider a supplier who chose type-i investment and faces the buyer's price oer, p.
(i) If p > ui, the selsh supplier accepts the oer and exerts zero eort: e
s(p; i) = 0. If p ui, he
rejects the oer and earns ui.
(ii) If p  + ui, the reciprocal supplier accepts the oer and exerts er(p; i) = c0 1(i). If ui <
p + ui, he accepts the oer and exerts zero eort, er(p; i) = 0. If p ui, he rejects the buyer's
oer and earns ui.
Lemma 1.(i) implies that the selsh supplier will never choose strictly positive eort. Since the
buyer will never earn positive prot from a selsh supplier, it is optimal for the buyer to oer p= 0,
and induce the supplier to reject. 9 On the other hand, facing the reciprocal supplier, the buyer
must compare the two options { oering a generous contract that makes the supplier exert strictly
positive eort and oering a very low oer so that the supplier rejects the contract. In order to
9Although any price p < ui can be an equilibrium, we focus on the case of p= 0 for expositional purpose.
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characterize the optimal oer, we denote an oer, p= 0, as a null contract. Similarly, if the buyer
oers p = (ui + ) to the supplier with type-i investment, we call this a reciprocal contract and
denote by Ri, i= b; g.
In preparation for our following Lemma, let us dene i =minfiji(c0 1(i))  ui     0g
as the minimum value of i that satises i(c
0 1(i))   ui     0. Because c0 1() is strictly
increasing in , there exists some threshold i > 0 above which the buyer nds it protable to oer
a reciprocal contract.
Lemma 2. Suppose the supplier chose type-i investment in the rst stage. Then, oering the
null contract is optimal when the buyer faces either the selsh supplier or the reciprocal supplier
with low quality coecient: i  i. Oering the reciprocal contract, Ri, is optimal if the buyer
faces a reciprocal supplier with high quality coecient, i >i.
Lemma 2 implies that the buyer oers a reciprocal contract to the supplier when the supplier
can provide suciently high value when type-i investment is made: i(c
0 1(i))   ui     0.
Rewriting the condition for both types of investment, the condition in Lemma 2 can be expressed
as follows:
Condition Cb : b  b and Condition Cg : g  g (5)
Now consider the supplier's investment in the rst stage. From Lemma 2, the selsh supplier
will receive the null contract no matter what he chose in the rst stage. Since the supplier will
always reject the null contract, it is optimal for the selsh supplier to choose the general investment
to raise his outside option value to ug. On the other hand, the optimal action for the reciprocal
supplier depends on which of the two conditions { Cb and Cg is met. Since b  g and ub <ug, it
suces to consider the following three cases (the fourth case, condition Cg is met and Cb is not,
cannot occur). The next result characterizes the equilibrium under the full information.
Theorem 1. In equilibrium, the following statements hold.
a) The selsh supplier chooses the general investment, the buyer oers the null contract, and the
supplier then rejects the oer.
(Parts b) to d) apply to the reciprocal supplier:)
b) Suppose that both Cb and Cg hold. If (1 )(ub+)  c(c0 1(b))+bc0 1(b) (1 )(ug+
) c(c0 1(g))+gc0 1(g), then the supplier chooses the buyer-specic investment, the buyer
oers the reciprocal contract, Rb, and the supplier chooses the eort level: e
r
b = c
0 1(b). Oth-
erwise, the supplier chooses the general investment, the buyer oers Rg, and the supplier chooses
eRg = g.
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c) Suppose that only condition Cb holds. If (1 )(ub+)  c(c0 1(b))+bc0 1(b) ug, then
the supplier chooses the buyer-specic investment, the buyer oers Rb, and the supplier chooses the
eort level: erb . Otherwise, the supplier chooses the general investment, the buyer oers the null
contract, and the supplier rejects the buyer's oer.
d) Suppose that neither Cb nor Cg holds. Then, the supplier chooses the general investment, the
buyer oers the null contract, and the supplier rejects the buyer's oer.
3.2. Asymmetric Information Case
We now analyze the case where the supplier's type is private information. As in Spence (1973), we
use the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as our solution concept, imposing the restriction that
the buyer's belief is consistent with the buyer's knowledge of the supplier's behavior in equilibrium.
In particular, we characterize a separating equilibrium under which the supplier's investment acts
as a signal. We also derive pooling equilibria in which neither supplier reveals his type.10
3.2.1. Separating Equilibrium We rst claim that the selsh supplier chooses the general
investment and the reciprocal supplier chooses the buyer-specic investment in a separating equi-
librium. To see why this must be the case, suppose that there exists a separating equilibrium in
which the selsh supplier chooses the buyer-specic investment and the reciprocal supplier chooses
the general investment. From Lemma 2, the buyer will oer the null contract to the selsh supplier,
who rejects the oer and earns the outside option payo ub. Since ug  ub, the selsh supplier is
better o by deviating and making a general investment, and this contradicts the equilibrium. We
also note that, in a separating equilibrium, the buyer should oer the null contract to the selsh
supplier and contract Rb to the reciprocal supplier. Consequently, the selsh supplier rejects the
oer and the reciprocal supplier accepts the oer and exerts eort eb = c
0 1(b).
We characterize a sucient condition under which the separating equilibrium exists in the next
lemma. In preparation, let  be the real fraction of reciprocal suppliers in the marketplace, j 2 [0;1]
be the buyer's prior belief that the supplier's type is j, j 2 fr = reciprocal; s= selshg, and (jji)
be the buyer's updated belief about the supplier's type when the supplier chooses investment i,
i2 fb; gg.
Theorem 2. There exists a separating equilibrium in which the selsh supplier chooses the gen-
eral investment and the reciprocal supplier chooses the buyer-specic investment, the buyer oers
the null contract to the selsh supplier and contract Rb to the reciprocal supplier, and the selsh sup-
plier rejects the oer and the reciprocal supplier accepts the oer and exerts eort eb = c
0 1(b),
resulting in (rjb) = 1 and (rjg) = 0 if and only if the following condition holds:
10Under certain conditions, semi-pooling equilibria may arise in which one type of supplier chooses a pure strategy
and the other uses a mixed strategy when choosing the investment type. We focus on the separating and pooling
equilibria as they are most relevant to our experimental results.
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i) ug  ub+ ,
ii) (1 )(ub+ )  c(erb )+berb  ug.
The rst condition guarantees that the selsh supplier's outside option is greater than what he
would get by choosing the buyer-specic investment and exerting zero eort. The second condition
guarantees that the reciprocal supplier's utility with the buyer-specic investment is greater than
his prot when he mimicks to be selsh. We note that i) and ii) together imply (1   )(ub +
)  c(erb ) + berb  ub + , which means that condition Cb holds. The result implies that pre-
contractual investment can be a signal when ug is high enough so that the selsh supplier is
incentivized to choose the general investment, and, at the same time, b is high enough that
fullling the buyer's contract is more attractive to the reciprocal supplier.
Under the buyer-specic investment, the supplier exerts eort erb and the buyer pays price
ub+, so the buyer's prot is be
r
b   ub , which is greater than zero by condition Cb. Under the
general investment the buyer earns zero prots. Under the buyer-specic investment, reciprocal
suppliers earn a monetary prot of ub+ c(erb ), and derive utility (1 )(ub+) c(erb )+berb
(note that, if everything is held constant, the reciprocal suppliers' utility increases more than
their monetary prots as eort increases). Under the general investment, selsh suppliers earn ug.
Condition i) in Theorem 2 means that suppliers' monetary prots are higher under the general
investment. Finally, total prots are be
r
b   c(erb ) under the specic investment and ug under the
general investment. Because of the convexity of c(e), be
r
b  c(erb ) exceeds ug if erb is large enough.
3.2.2. Pooling Equilibrium In a pooling equilibrium, both suppliers will choose the same
investment, thus the buyer is unable to discern the supplier type. In our setting, two pooling
equilibria can exist{ both types choosing the general investment and both types choosing the
specic investment. To avoid a potentially large number of equilibria, we rene multiple equilibria
with the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987). The intuitive criterion states that for any belief
the uninformed player may have after seeing a deviation, if one type of player receives a worse
payo by deviating than his equilibrium payo and the other type does not, then the deviation
should not be attributed to the player whose payo decreases.
In the next result, we characterize three pooling equilibria that survive the intuitive criterion. In
preparation, dene a threshold ~i =
ui+
ic
0 1(i)
for i= b and g. Since ub  ug and c0 1() is increasing
in  and b >g, then ~g  ~b.
Theorem 3. There are three pooling equilibria that survive the intuitive criterion.
a) If  ~b, a pooling equilibrium under which both suppliers choose the buyer-specic investment
arises. In this equilibrium, the buyer oers a reciprocal contract Rb, and both suppliers accept the
oer, the selsh supplier exerts zero eort and the reciprocal supplier exerts eort erb = c
0 1(b).
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b) If  ~g, a pooling equilibrium under which both suppliers choose the general investment arises.
In this equilibrium, the buyer oers a reciprocal contract Rg, both suppliers accept the oer, the
selsh supplier exerts zero eort and the reciprocal supplier exerts eort erg = c
0 1(g).
c) If  < ~g, a pooling equilibrium under which both suppliers choose the general investment arises.
In this equilibrium, the buyer oers the null contract and both suppliers reject the buyer's oer.
Intuitively, if the buyer believes that the supplier is likely to be reciprocal after observing the
supplier's investment, the buyer oers the corresponding reciprocal contract: Rb for the buyer-
specic investment and Rg for the general investment. Otherwise, the buyer oers the null contract.
From an earlier result, the selsh supplier always exerts zero eort. However, the reciprocal supplier
exerts positive eort in response to the reciprocal contract, and zero eort in response to the null
contract. The detailed condition under which each of the three equilibrium exists is relegated to
the appendix.
In all three pooling equilibria described in Theorem 3 buyers' expected prots depend on the
probability the buyer is facing a reciprocal supplier, . In the pooling equilibrium described in parts
a) and b), buyers' expected prots are (ie
r
i )  ui   , selsh suppliers earn prot ui +  and
reciprocal suppliers earn prot ui+ c(eri ) and get utility (1 )(ui+) c(eri )+ieri . Thus,
expected total surplus in the pooling equilibria described in a) and b) is (ie
r
i )  c(eri ). In the
pooling equilibrium described in part c) the buyer earns zero prots and both types of suppliers
earn ug, so total surplus is ug.
3.3. Theoretical Predictions
Our model predicts that a separating equilibrium can exist when the following two conditions are
met. First, the quality improvement under the buyer-specic investment must be large enough so
that the reciprocal supplier has enough incentive to exert eort on behalf of the buyer. Second,
the outside option payo under the general investment should be large enough so that the selsh
supplier is incentivized to choose the general investment in order to improve his outside option
value when the transaction does not close, but not too large so that the reciprocal supplier is
not tempted to choose the general investment. If at least one of these two conditions is not met,
the separating equilibrium breaks down. For example, if b is very low, both suppliers will choose
the general investment. On the other hand, if ug is very low, both suppliers prefer to choose the
buyer-specic investment.
In the experiment, we conduct a main treatment where the parameters of each investment are
such that the separating equilibrium is likely to occur for reasonable values of individual-specic
parameters ( and ). In order to test that the underlying mechanism that leads to these results is
in fact the separating equilibrium, we conduct two additional treatments. The rst one is the low
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benet treatment, where we reduce the value of b, leaving all other parameters constant. As shown
in Theorem 2, reducing b decreases the set of parameters  and  under which the separating
equilibrium can arise and increases the probability that both types of supplier choose the general
investment. The second is the random treatment, where suppliers are randomly assigned an invest-
ment. This treatment allows us to test whether the underlying mechanism driving the results is
that in a separating equilibrium suppliers choose the buyer-specic investment to signal reciprocity.
Because the investment is randomly assigned to suppliers, the fraction of reciprocal suppliers is
the same under both investments and the dierences in the outcome across investments can only
be attributed to the specic investment having a higher quality coecient. Thus, comparing the
dierences across investments in the random treatment relative to the main treatment allows to
measure the impact of the separating mechanism.
4. Experimental Design
Our experiment consisted of ten rounds of the supply chain game and, after the supply chain ended,
one round of each of two additional tasks: an investment game (Berg et al. 1995) to measure trust
and reciprocity and a lottery task (Dohmen and Falk 2011) to measure risk attitudes.
4.1. The Supply Chain Game
Subjects were randomly assigned to the role of supplier or buyer, which they kept for all ten periods.
In each period subjects were randomly and anonymously matched. This setup rules out reputation
or repeated game eects. The supply chain game proceeded as described in our theoretical model:
the supplier chooses between the buyer-specic or general investment, the buyer makes a price
oer, and nally the supplier accepts or rejects the oer and makes an eort choice. For the buyer-
specic investment, we set b = 12, ub = 0. For the general investment, we set g = 3, ug = 15. We
also assume that the supplier incurs costs for his eort according to the canonical form, c(e) = 1
2
e2.
In order to simplify the subjects' task, they were presented with the following table:
Table 1 Cost of Eort Function
e 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 0.5 2 4.5 8 12.5 18 24.5 32 40.5 50
In order to rule out negative payos, we added 60 points to the payo of suppliers and 100
points to the payo of buyers. Hence, the suppliers' payo was S = 60+p  c(e) if he accepted the
oer or S = 60+ u if he rejected, while the buyers' payo was R = 100+  e  p if the supplier
accepted the oer or R = 100 if the supplier rejected. At the end of each round, subjects were
informed about what their payo was and what the other subject made.
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4.2. Two Additional Tasks
The lottery task gave subjects fteen choices between a xed payo, which ranges from 2:5 to
37:5 in increments of 2:5, or a 50-50 lottery between a payo of 40 points and a payo of zero
points. One decision was randomly selected for payment. The number of choices of the xed payo
provides a measure of risk aversion.
The investment game has two roles: senders and receivers. Both senders and receivers are initially
endowed with twenty points. The sender can transfer a portion of his endowment to the receiver,
with any amount transfer being tripled. The receiver can then make a return transfer (without
tripling) to the sender. We use the strategy method, with each subject choosing how much to
send if they are the sender, and how much to return for each possible transfer amount if they are
the receiver. 11 Subjects were then randomly assigned a role and matched to another subject for
payment.
4.3. Additional Treatments
We conducted two additional treatments of the supply chain game 12. In the \low benet" treatment
we reduce b from 12 to 6, making the specic investment less attractive and therefore reducing
the range of individual parameters,  and , within which the separating equilibrium arises. In the
\random" treatment suppliers were randomly assigned to an investment. By assigning investments
exogenously, we eliminate the signaling mechanism.
4.4. Hypotheses
In the main treatment of the experiment we expect to observe behavior consistent with the sep-
arating equilibrium. We set the values of the investment parameters such that the separating
equilibrium can arise at moderate values of  and . For instance, a moderate range of  (between
0:25 and 0:45) can sustain the separating equilibrium for  between 0 and 10. To derive hypotheses
for the main treatment, we examine the comparative statics of the equilibrium outcomes from the
model. We also derive hypotheses from the underlying cognitive mechanisms of reciprocity that
generates those equilibrium results.
Recall that in the separating equilibrium reciprocal suppliers choose the buyer-specic investment
and are oered a positive price, which they accept and exert positive eort, and selsh suppliers
choose the general investment and are oered a null contract, which they reject. Thus, we expect to
11Using the strategy method means that the receiver, instead of being asked how much he would like to send back
given the amount he received, was asked how much to return for each possible transfer amount. In this way, we are
able to elicit his complete strategy rather than his action in one particular case.
12We conducted a third additional treatment which was equivalent to the main treatment but with higher b (18,
versus 12 in the main treatment). All the results we present for the main treatment also hold for the treatment with
b = 18. Because the results are similar to those in the main treatment, we excluded them from the paper except for
minor comments.
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see higher price, higher acceptance and higher eort under the specic investment. Buyers' prots
under the buyer-specic investment are be
r
b   ub   and are zero under the general investment
and suppliers earn ub +    c(erb ) under the buyer-specic investment and ug under the general
investment. Total prots should be higher under the buyer-specic investment once a certain level
of eort is reached. For the values of the parameters adopted in our experiment, this should be true
for any eort greater than 1:33. Thus, the buyer-specic investment should lead to higher prices,
higher acceptance, higher quality, higher buyer prots, and higher total surplus than the general
investment.
We can also observe the separation mechanism based on reciprocity in how suppliers respond to
dierent price oers. Note that while the equilibrium makes specic point predictions for prices, the
experimental data is likely to have a range of price oers. Lemma 1 describes how we should expect
subjects to respond to dierent price oers. Because subjects who choose the general investment
are predicted to be selsh, they will provide the same (low) eort for any price oer. However,
subjects who choose the specic investment reciprocate high price oers. Hence we would expect
that under the specic investment low prices will receive low eort, while high prices will receive
high eort.13 Therefore, there should be a strong positive correlation between price and eort in
the specic investment, and a weak or zero correlation under the general investment. Therefore,
our theory predicts:
HYPOTHESIS 1. [Transaction Outcomes] In the main treatment, we expect the relationship
between supplier and buyer in the main treatment to become more collaborative under the buyer-
specic investment: (a) buyers will oer higher prices, (b) suppliers will accept oers more often
and exert higher eort, (c) the price-eort relationship will increase, and (d) buyers' prots and
total prots will increase.
Additionally, our model assumes that investment decisions are driven by suppliers separating
based on intrinsic characteristics. That is, intrinsically reciprocal suppliers choose the specic
investment and intrinsically selsh suppliers choose the general investment. As a result, we expect
that at the individual level subjects will dier in their propensity to choose the buyer-specic invest-
ment. In particular, we expect that there will be a positive correlation between subjects choosing
the specic investment more often and subjects demonstrating a more \reciprocal" behavior in our
experiment. We will identify \reciprocal" behavior in two ways. First, we measure subjects' price-
eort correlation when they choose the specic investment and use the slope of the eort-price
regression as a measure of reciprocity. This is common in the experimental reciprocity literature.
13Additionally, we have simplied things theoretically by assuming that all reciprocal suppliers have the same  and
. This additional heterogeneity will further enhance and smooth out the price-eort correlation we describe.
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For example Fehr et al. (1993) use the wage-eort relationship in the gift exchange game, while
Berg et al. (1995) use the ratio of amount sent to amount returned in an investment game. Second,
we create a measure of reciprocity based on the subject's return transfer decisions in the investment
game. We therefore expect:
HYPOTHESIS 2. [Reciprocal Suppliers] In the main treatment, the frequency of choosing the
specic investment is positively correlated with suppliers being more reciprocal as measured by:
2.a - a higher eort-price correlation in the supply chain game, and
2.b - more reciprocal behavior in the additional investment game.
In the low benet treatment, we reduce the quality coecient of the buyer-specic investment
(making the specic investment less attractive) and expect that the separating equilibrium will be
less likely to occur. Specically, the set of values of  and  that allow for the separating equilib-
rium to occur is considerably smaller that in the main treatment. In the low benet treatment, a
separating equilibrium arises only when  is between 0:84 and 0:91 and  is between 0 and 2.
Lower levels of the quality coecient result in greater incentives for the reciprocal suppliers to
choose the general investment. Thus, we expect to nd results that are consistent with a pooling
equilibrium on the general investment. From Theorem 3, the buyer oers a reciprocal contract if
he believes there are a sucient share of reciprocal suppliers, and oers a null contract otherwise.
Reciprocal suppliers exert positive eort if they are oered a reciprocal contract and reject the oer
and get the outside option if they are oered a null contract. Selsh suppliers accept a reciprocal
contract and exert zero eort and reject a null contract. The overall eort (under the specic
and general investments combined) exerted in the low benet treatment is at most erg and will
be oered by at most a fraction  of suppliers (i.e. reciprocal suppliers when oered a reciprocal
contract). Thus, the overall expected eort in the low benet treatment should be lower than in
the main treatment, where all reciprocal suppliers exert eort erb .
In our experiment, the general investment provides suppliers with a higher outside option than
the specic investment (15 vs. 0). Thus, in a pooling equilibrium on the general investment, sup-
pliers will be more likely to reject low price oers. Assuming prices are high enough to trigger
reciprocity, buyers can expect eort erb from all reciprocal suppliers under the main treatment, and
at most erg from reciprocal suppliers who are oered a reciprocal contract under the low benet
treatment. Thus, the average eort in oers with price greater or equal to 15, should be higher in
the main treatment.
The transaction eciency should also be lower in the low benet treatment relative to the
main treatment. The expected total surplus (the prots of buyers and suppliers combined) in the
separating equilibrium is [be
r
b  c(erb )]+(1 )ug as we expect that the proportion of reciprocal
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suppliers is . In the pooling equilibrium on the general investment where the buyer oers a
reciprocal contract, reciprocal suppliers accept the oer and choose eort erg and selsh suppliers
accept the oer and exert zero eort. In this case, the expected total surplus is [ge
r
b   c(erb )],
which is lower than the expected total surplus of the separating equilibrium. Likewise, in the
pooling equilibrium on the general investment where the buyer oers a null contract, the expected
total surplus is ug. When Hypothesis 1 is supported and total surplus is higher under the specic
investment than under the general investment in the main treatment, then the expected total
surplus should be higher in the main treatment than in the low benet treatment, as be
r
b  c(erb )
ug.
HYPOTHESIS 3. [Low benet treatment] Under the low benet treatment, results are consistent
with those of pooling equilibria on the general investment.
3.a - The overall eort provided by suppliers and total prots are lower than in the main treatment.
3.b - Considering only accepted high price oers, eort is lower than in the main treatment.
Similarly to the low benet treatment, the random treatment also makes the separating equi-
librium less likely to occur. Suppliers are randomly assigned to an investment, which severs the
connection between investment choice and the supplier's underlying preferences. To represent the
random treatment we adapt our theoretical model by adding an initial move by nature that ran-
domly assigns an investment to the supplier. Building on previous results, we identied three
possible cases: If the buyer believes that the probability that the supplier is reciprocal is high
enough, then he oers a reciprocal contract regardless of the investment. If the belief is moderate,
he only oers a reciprocal contract under the buyer-specic investment and, if the belief is low, he
does not oer a reciprocal contract in any case. The model is described in the appendix.
The expected overall eort and total prots should be lower in the random treatment than in the
main treatment. The expected overall eort is erb in the main treatment and at most
1
2
erb +
1
2
erg
in the random treatment. The expected total prot is [be
r
b   c(erb )] + (1   )ug in the main
treatment and 1
2
[be
r
b  c(erb )]+ 12 ug in the random treatment (assuming that case 2 arises, which
is the most consistent with our results). Thus, if be
r
b   c(erb )> ug, as predicted by Hypothesis 1,
then expected total prots should be lower in the random treatment.
Additionally, the dierence in expected eort and expected total prot across investments should
be smaller in the random treatment relative to the main treatment. When the investment is ran-
domly assigned we expect the reciprocal eort erb to be exerted by a fraction  of the suppliers
with the specic investment (i.e. when buyers oer a reciprocal contract to a reciprocal supplier).
Additionally, with the random investment, the expected eort under the general investment can
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be greater than zero since reciprocal suppliers exert positive eort when oered a reciprocal con-
tract even under the general investment. By the same argument, the dierence in the total prot
between the two investments should also be smaller in the random treatment than in the main
treatment. Assuming case 2 arises in the random treatment, expected total prot under the specic
investment is [be
r
b   c(erb )] and under the general investment it is ug.
Finally, since in the random treatment the investment is no longer related to the the supplier's
inherent type, we do not expect the specic investment to be positively correlated with the subject's
reciprocity. These predictions are presented in our last hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 4. [Random Treatment] Under the random treatment, expected eort and
expected total prots are lower than in the main treatment, and the dierences between the two
investments is smaller than under the main treatment.
4.a - The overall eort provided by suppliers and total prots are lower than in the main treatment.
4.b - The dierence in expected eort and expected total prots between the two investments is
smaller than in the main treatment.
4.c - There will be no relationship between reciprocity (measured by the eort-price correlation and
the behavior in the additional investment game) and the specic investment.
4.5. Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) at the University of Michigan between
June and July of 2011 and September and November of 2014. Subjects were paid for one randomly
selected round of the Supply Chain game, for the investment game, and for one randomly selected
choice from the lottery task. Subjects received $0:05 per point earned plus a $5 show up fee.
Average payos were $12 (including the show up fee) and each session lasted approximately one
hour. 14
5. Experimental Results
We conducted thirteen sessions of the main treatment of the experiment with between eight to
fourteen subjects each time, who each played ten rounds of the supply chain game and one round
of each additional task 15. Overall, we had a total of 134 participants for the main treatment, 67
of which played as suppliers and 67 as buyers.
14 The subjects were students at the University of Michigan. No subject participated in more than one session of the
experiment. Average age was 21 years, 43% were female and 57% were male. When asked about ethnicity, 49% of
the subjects identied themselves as white, 36% as Asian or Pacic Islander, 9% as Black/African American, and
the remainder as Hispanic, Multiracial, or Other. Students were from a range of dierent majors: 21% from Social
Sciences, 20% from Sciences, 20% from Engineering, 10% from Economics, 8% from Business Administration, 5%
from Arts and humanities, 5% from Medicine, and 11% from other elds.
15 The analysis presented in the Experimental Results section includes the data of the ten rounds. The results are
qualitatively the same if we consider only the last ve periods of play.
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5.1. Dierences between investments
Table 2 reports the fraction of times each investment was chosen and the average price, proportion
of acceptance, average eort and average eort in accepted oers under the two investments. Since
the supplier had the option of rejecting the buyer's oer and getting his outside option payo, we
distinguish the cases when the supplier accepts the oer and exerts zero eort from those when he
rejects the oer. This allows us to observe in isolation the cases where the transaction did occur.
Additionally, because under the general investment the supplier has an outside option of 15, we
observe what happens to the proportion of acceptance and to eort when prices are greater than 15.
For prices greater than 15, the outside option becomes irrelevant under both investments, making
them more comparable.
Our hypotheses for the main treatment predict that the results will be consistent with a sepa-
rating equilibrium where reciprocal suppliers choose the buyer-specic investment, will be oered
higher prices which they will accept and will choose higher eort; while selsh suppliers will choose
the general investment, will be oered lower prices which they reject, and will receive the outside
option payo.
Table 2 Investment Comparison
Average Average Average Eort Average Eort
Investment % Chosen Price % Accept Eort (accepted oers) (accepted oers)
Price  15
Specic 67.46% 24.64 87% 1.78 2.03 2.74
General 32.54% 12.62 39% 0.80 2.04 2.02
Rank Sum test (p-value) < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 0.90 0.023
5.1.1. Price Our model predicts that buyers will oer higher prices to suppliers who chose
the specic investment. In line with this prediction, we observe that the average price oered by
the buyers when the suppliers choose the specic investment is nearly double than the price oered
when the suppliers choose the general investment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p < 0:001). We also
verify this result by regressing price on a dummy variable for the specic investment (Table 18 in
the Appendix). We nd that choosing the specic investment increases the price the buyer oers
by 11.29 points (p < 0:01), supporting Hypothesis 1:a. At an individual level, we nd that 72% of
the subjects oer a higher price under the specic investment than under the general investment
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p < 0:001).
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5.1.2. Acceptance In line with Hypothesis 1:b, the specic investment led to higher accep-
tance rates by suppliers (see Table 2). To control for price, we regress acceptance on price and
investment type and present the results in Table 19. We nd that, even after controlling for price,
choosing the specic investment increases the probability of acceptance by 26.38 percentage points
( = 1:884, p < 0:001, marginal eects = 0:2638). To correctly control for the dierence in the
outside option value, we repeat the same regression restricting the sample to oers with a price
of 15 or higher, and nd that there is still a signicant positive correlation between choosing the
specic investment and the probability of acceptance ( = 1:323, p = 0:003, marginal eects =
0:071). Together these results provide support to Hypothesis 1:b.
5.1.3. Eort Table 2 shows that average eort under the specic investment more than dou-
bled average eort under the general investment and that the dierence is signicant (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test: p < 0:001). If we consider accepted oers only, we nd no dierence across invest-
ments. Our reciprocity model predicts not only higher eort levels under the specic investment
but specically eort that depends on price. While the general investment has an outside option
of 15, the specic investment has an outside option of zero. Hence, rejections are more likely to
happen under the general investment than under the specic investment for prices lower than 15
(28% rejection under specic versus 87% rejection under general, p < 0001), and hence the set of
accepted oers for the specic investment includes more oers with a low price. Therefore, we are
interested in testing whether there is a dierence in eort across investments for accepted oers
with price greater than 15. We nd that, for prices greater or equal than 15, average eort in
accepted oers under the specic investment is 2:74 and under the general investment it is 2:02 and
the dierence is statistically signicant (p= 0:023). Additionally, individual-level data shows that
57% of subjects exert higher eort under the specic investment than under the general investment
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p= 0:016). This result supports Hypothesis 1:c.
Table 3 presents the results of regressing eort on price under the two investment types. Panel
A uses price as the independent variable and Panel B uses a price dummy, which takes the value
of one if price is greater or equal to 15 and zero otherwise. The last four columns present only the
cases when suppliers accepted the oer. The last two columns show the results of a Tobit regression
for eort censored at zero. In all specications we nd a higher eort coecient for price under
the specic investment 16.
Because we expect that the response to price will not necessarily be linear, and that the dier-
ences between the specic and general investment will be greatest at the higher quantiles of the
16 To test whether the dierences in coecients across investments are signicant, we combined the data into one
regression. The results are presented in Table 21 in the appendix. A Tobit regression of accepted oers shows that
the dierence in the price dummy coecients between the specic and general investments is statistically signicant
(p-value = 0:017).
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eort distribution (and associated with the corresponding higher quantiles of the price distribu-
tion), Table 4 estimates the dierence between treatments at the 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles. We
also test whether the investments dier in responsiveness to price changes, and whether the total
eort dierence (at the corresponding price quantile) is signicant. We observe that the dierences
are signicant beyond the 75th percentile. These results imply that eort under the specic invest-
ment is more price-sensitive throughout the right tail of the eort distribution, consistent with
Hypothesis 1:c. Additionally, we nd that higher prices lead to an increased share of higher eorts
under the specic investment, consistent with the summary statistics shown in Table 2.
Table 3 Price - Eort Relationship
Coecients Eort Eort Eort Eort Eort Eort
(Specic) (General) (Specic) (General) (Specic) (General)
(Accepted) (Accepted) (Accepted) (Accepted)
Panel A
Price 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.058*** 0.028 0.0831*** 0.055**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.020) (0.006) (0.023)
Constant 0.219* 0.173 0.309** 1.400** -1.430*** -0.209
(0.113) (0.173) (0.144) (0.651) (0.347) (0.800)
Panel B
High Price 2.158*** 1.532*** 1.938*** 0.167 3.521*** 0.798
(0.239) (0.305) (0.254) (1.002) (0.374) (0.984)
Constant 0.477*** 0.318** 0.678*** 1.950** -1.534*** 0.544
(0.123) (0.152) (0.167) (0.926) (0.411) (0.962)
Observations 452 218 397 86 397 86
Number of Subjects 66 55 65 38 65 38
Columns 1 to 4: OLS with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Columns 5 and
6: Tobit regressions with subject random eects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Panel A has Price as
independent variable. Panel B has indicator variable High Price, which is equal to 1 if price is greater or equal than
15 and zero otherwise, as independent variable. Signicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
5.1.4. Prot We next examine whether the buyer, the supplier and the whole supply chain
benet from the specic investment.
Hypothesis 1:d predicts that buyers' prot is higher under the specic investment. Our data
supports this - buyers' average prot was 96:88 under the specic investment and 92:94 under the
general investment (p = 0:02) 17. When we regress buyers' prot on the specic investment, we
nd a positive and signicant eect (coecient = 4:794, p < 0:01, presented in Table 20 in the
Appendix). Additionally, a within-subject comparison of average prot under the two investments
17 In the treatment where we used b = 18, buyers' average prot was 101:968 (not statistically dierent than 100)
under the specic investment and 67:333 under the general investment, a signicant dierence (p < 0:01).
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Table 4 Price-Eort Quantile Regressions - Main Treatment
Treatment Main
Quantile 0:50 0:75 0:90
Coecients Eort
Price x Specic 0.076*** 0.093*** 0.083***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
Price x General 0.057*** 0.048*** -0.040
(0.017) (0.016) (0.052)
Specic -0.076 -1.127* -5.167**
(0.423) (0.671) (2.293)
Constant 0 1.571** 7***
(0.413) (0.647) (2.263)
Observations 483 483 483
Dierence in Price Slopes (Test Specic = General)
(p  value) 0.323 0.006 0.020
Total Investment Eects on Eort
Specic - General 0.300 0.672 2.233
(p  value) 0.267 0.010 0.088
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01. Total
Investment Eects estimates the total dierence between investments given prices at the corresponding quantiles of
the price distribution.
shows that, for an individual buyer, prots were higher when he was paired with a supplier who
chose the specic investment than when he was paired with a supplier who chose the general
investment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p= 0:016, 61% of the subjects).
Hypothesis 1:d also predicts that total prots are higher under the specic investment. A regres-
sion of total prot on a dummy variable for choosing the specic investment shows that the specic
investment has a signicant positive eect on total prots, consistently with Hypothesis 1:d (coef-
cient = 5:357, p < 0:01, presented in Table 20 in the appendix) Average total prots were 177:11
under the specic investment and 169:48 under the general investment, but this dierence is not
statistically signicant.
Our hypotheses focus on buyer's prot and total surplus, since for the supplier the positive
dierence from the specic investment should come from the unobservable reciprocal utility of
increasing total prots. Under the separating equilibrium the suppliers monetary prots should be
higher under the general investment to prevent selsh suppliers from switching their investment
choice. In our data, however, suppliers' average prot under the specic investment were not
signicantly lower than that under the general investment (80:23 under specic vs. 76:54 under
general, Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p= 0:97 ). Similarly, the within-subject pairwise comparison of
average prot under the two investments shows that a supplier's prot was not signicantly higher
under the specic investment than under the general investment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p=
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0:1935). A regression shows that the specic investment increases suppliers' prot by 3:215 points
and the eect is signicant a the 5% signicance level (see Table 20 in the appendix). While this
is at slight variance with our model, it suggests that selsh suppliers may separate from reciprocal
suppliers even with weak monetary incentives to do so. This may suggest that the outcomes of the
separating equilibrium could occur in a wider range of circumstances than the model predicts.
5.2. Individual Dierences
We next examine whether the aggregate results discussed in the previous section are caused by all
subjects behaving dierently under the specic investment, or whether individuals who choose the
specic investment are inherently dierent from those who choose the general one.
5.2.1. Heterogeneity in Investment Choice If investment choice is driven by sorting based
on an underlying preference type, some subjects should persistently choose either the specic or
the general investment. We conduct several tests to address the question of whether subjects dier
in their underlying probabilities of choosing the specic investment. Figure 1 displays the fraction
of subjects who chose the specic investment a given number of times. To determine whether this
sorting is statistically signicant, we test this result in three dierent ways.
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Figure 1 Frequency of Choosing Specic Investment
First, we look at the number of times a subject chose the specic investment in the rst ve
periods compared to the last ve periods of the game. Subjects who choose the specic investment
more often in the initial periods are signicantly more likely to continue to choose it in the later
periods (= 0:588, p < 0:05). We nd similar results using a non-parametric test for trends (p <
0:01)18. Lastly, a permutation test indicates that signicantly more subjects choose the specic
18We used a \Wilcoxon-like test for trends" introduced by Cuzick (1985). The test conducts a non-parametric test
for trend across ordered groups, which is an extension of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. It works by computing the
average ranks for one group and then correlating the average ranks with the values in the other group. It tests for a
trend of (increasing) values in the ranks of one group across the values of the other group.
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investment at least 8 times than would be expected if all subjects chose between investments with a
common probability in each period (p < 0:01).19 This provides initial evidence that subjects exhibit
signicant heterogeneity in investment choices.
5.2.2. Heterogeneity in Eort Choice We next examine whether this dierence in invest-
ment choice between subjects corresponds with dierent eort choices. We expect that subjects
who choose the specic investment frequently will be inherently more reciprocal. Hence, as pre-
dicted by Hypothesis 2:a, we should nd that these subjects have a larger price-eort relationship.
To test for this, in Table 5 we regress eort on price, conditional on having the specic investment
in this period, separately for subjects who frequently (infrequently) choose the specic investment
across all periods.20 The rst four columns were estimated with an OLS regression and the fth
and sixth columns correspond to the Tobit regressions for eort censored at zero. We nd that
the eect of price on eort is approximately twice as large for subjects who frequently chose the
specic investment. Table 22 in the Appendix combines the data in one regression and shows that
the dierence in eort-price correlation between subjects who choose the specic investment with
high and low frequency is statistically signicant (p < 0:001). This shows that suppliers who choose
the specic investment more often were also more reciprocal, providing support for Hypothesis
2:a. Choosing the specic investment does accurately signal that the supplier is inherently more
reciprocal, and will choose a higher eort if oered a high price.
Table 5 Individual Specic Price-Eort Relationships Under Specic Investment
Coecients Eort Eort Eort Eort Eort Eort
(Specic < 8) (Specic 8+) (Specic < 8) (Specic 8+) (Specic < 8) (Specic 8+)
(Accepted) (Accepted) (Accepted) (Accepted)
Price 0.031*** 0.076*** 0.026*** 0.076*** 0.053*** 0.096***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006)
Constant 0.574*** 0.043 0.783*** 0.040 -1.263** -1.270***
(0.157) (0.126) (0.201) (0.174) (0.547) (0.410)
Observations 192 260 165 232 165 232
Nr. of Subjects 38 28 37 28 37 28
Columns 1 to 4: OLS with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Columns 5 and 6
report Tobit regressions with subject random eects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Signicance is denoted:
* p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
19 For each period, we shued the investment decisions across subjects and compared the number of times subjects
got the specic investment with the frequencies observed in the experimental results. We conducted 100:000 iterations
of the shuing
20 The cuto point of choosing the specic investment at least eight was chosen based on the results of the permutation
test reported above.
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5.2.3. Heterogeneity in Trust and Risk Attitudes We further examined two additional
questions: whether other behavioral factors inuence sorting, and whether other measures of reci-
procity correlate with the measure obtained from the eort-price correlation in the supply chain
game. After playing the supply chain game, subjects played one round of the investment game and
completed a risk aversion task 21. We measured risk aversion as the fraction of times the subject
chose the xed payo over the 50 50 chance lottery, yielding a distribution of subjects' risk aver-
sion between 0 and 1. In the investment game subjects could choose to send between 0 and 20
points in increments of two points to some other subject they were randomly and anonymously
paired with. Any amount sent was tripled. Subjects were then asked how much they would like
to send back for dierent amounts they could have received, up to the total amount received. We
used the amount sent as a measure of subjects' trust, therefore trust ranged between 0 and 20.
We created a measure of subject's reciprocity based on their answers to how much they would
return by taking the dierence between the maximum and the minimum amounts they wanted to
return 22. Given that in the vast majority of the cases the amount returned was (at least weakly)
increasing in the amount sent, this measure of reciprocity captured how dierent the subjects'
response was when the sender was kind from when the sender was unkind. Reciprocity could then
range between 0 and 60. Table 6 summarizes risk aversion, trust and reciprocity observed in the
two additional tasks.
Table 6 Risk and Trust Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Trust 8.104 4 7.399 0 20
Reciprocity 16.515 18 13.111 0 40
Risk aversion 0.518 0.533 0.145 0 1
In columns 1 through 6 of Table 7, we regress investment choice (for suppliers) and price (for
buyers) on three dummy variables which were set equal to one if the subject's measure of trust,
21One potential concern is that the course of play in the preceding supply chain game inuenced subjects choices
in the the additional tasks. While we cannot fully rule out this form of reverse-causality, we tried to minimize the
connections by using contextualized instructions for the supply chain game and abstract instructions for the additional
tasks. Additionally, if there were substantial spill-over eects from the supply chain game, one might expect that
subjects who had been playing dierent roles would make dierent choices in the additional tasks. However, we do
not nd a signicant dierence between suppliers and buyers (p > 0:20 for risk aversion and reciprocity, p > 0:10 for
trust). Additionally, subjects who were randomly assigned the specic investment more or less often in the random
treatment (described below) do not make signicantly dierent choices in the additional tasks.
22We considered two other measures of reciprocity, one was the dierence between the minimum and maximum
amount returned as a fraction of the amount received and the other one was the sum of all the net returns. All the
main results remained the same regardless of which measure of reciprocity was used.
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reciprocity or risk aversion was above the median value, and equal to zero otherwise. We nd
that reciprocity in the investment game is a good predictor of sorting in the investment choice of
the supply chain game. Specically, having an investment game measure of reciprocity above the
median is correlated with a higher likelihood of choosing the specic investment. This provides
support for Hypothesis 2:b. Additionally, suppliers who are more trusting (i.e. sent more in the
trust game) are signicantly more likely to choose the specic investment eight times or more. This
suggests that suppliers sort not only on their willingness to repay high prices within the supply
chain game and their reciprocity measure in the investment game, but also on their propensity to
trust in others. Similarly, we nd that trust also predicts buyers' willingness to oer high prices.
Lastly, in columns 7 to 9 we present the interaction eects of the suppliers' trust, reciprocity and
risk aversion measures and price on eort. We nd that higher levels of trust and reciprocity in
the investment game are associated with a higher eort-price correlation in the supply chain game
(when we test the dierence in coecients for high versus low trust, reciprocity, and risk aversion
we get p= 0:013;0:061; and 0:228 respectively).
Table 7 Eect of Risk and Trust Measures
Coecients Chose Specic 8+ Price Eort
High Trust 1.298*** 9.920*** -1.049
(0.357) (3.773) (0.646)
High Reciprocity 0.630** 4.909 -0.501
(0.314) (3.603) (0.641)
High Risk Aversion -0.047 -1.729 0.495
(0.313) (4.587) (0.655)
Price*High Trust 0.092***
(0.007)
Price*Low Trust 0.062***
(0.010)
Price*High Reciprocity 0.094***
(0.009)
Price*Low Reciprocity 0.072***
(0.008)
Price*High Risk Aversion 0.076***
(0.008)
Price*Low Risk Aversion 0.090***
(0.009)
Constant -1.044*** -0.508** -0.180 16.880*** 18.458*** 21.968*** -0.619 -1.058** -1.576***
(0.297) (0.219) (0.238) (1.830) (2.252) (4.179) (0.502) (0.442) (0.512)
Observations 67 67 67 670 670 670 483 483 483
Nr. of Subjects 67 67 67 67 67 67 66 66 66
Columns 1 to 3: Probit regression. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Columns 4 to 6: OLS with subject random
eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Columns 7 to 9: Tobit with subject random eects, accepted
oers only. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Signicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
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5.3. Additional Treatments
To provide additional evidence for investment choice as a signal of reciprocity, we conduct two
treatments that diminish the signaling mechanism. The low benet treatment, which decreases
the quality coecient b of the specic investment, should lead to results corresponding to a
pooling equilibrium on the general investment. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the expected overall
eort and expected total prots under the low benet treatment should be lower than under the
main treatment. The random treatment, which randomly allocates an investment to the supplier,
eliminates the signaling component in investment choice. Hypothesis 4 predicts that expected eort
and total prots and their dierences across investments should be lower than under the main
treatment. It also predicts that we should no longer see a relationship between reciprocity and the
specic investment.
We conducted ve sessions of each additional treatment, with 56 participants in the low benet
treatment and 54 participants in the random treatment. Table 8 reports summary statistics from
the two additional treatments.
Table 8 Investment Comparison - Additional Treatments
Average Average Average Average
Treatment Investment % Chosen Price % Accept Eort Eort Eort
(Accepted) (Accepted)
Price  15
Low Benet Specic 40% 19.86 87% 1.78 2.041 2.87
General 60% 12.72 32% 0.85 2.667 2.98
Rank Sum test (p-value)* < 0:001 < 0:001 < 0:001 0:0760 0:74
Random Specic 21.52 84% 1.040 1.236 1.63
General 14.00 40% 0.479 1.213 1.33
Rank Sum test (p-value)* < 0:01 < 0:001 < 0:001 0:815 0.64
* Non-parametric test of dierence in average price, acceptance, eort and total prot between general and specic
investments.
5.3.1. Price In the low benet treatment we nd that the general investment is chosen more
often than the specic investment, consistently with a pooling equilibrium on the general invest-
ment. Table 8 shows that average price is signicantly higher under the specic investment than
under the general investment. At an individual level, we nd that 78% of buyers oer higher
prices under the specic investment than under the general investment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test:
p < 0:01). There is no signicant dierence with the main treatment in price under the specic
investment (19:86 in the low benet treatment vs 24:64 in the main treatment, p= 0:319) or under
the general investment (12:72 in the low benet treatment versus 12:62 in the main treatment,
p= 0:659).
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In the random treatment, we observe that the dierence in average price under the two invest-
ments is smaller than in the main treatment (7:52 versus 12:02). Since both treatments have the
same quality coecients, the higher price premium under the specic investment in the main treat-
ment is attributed to the separating mechanism, which is not present in the random treatment. In
Table 9 we conrm that the additional treatments led to a smaller price premium for the specic
investment by estimating a separate coecient of the eect of investment on price for each treat-
ment. We nd that the price premium in the low benet treatment is signicantly smaller than in
the main treatment (p= 0:01) while the price premium in the random treatment is directionally
smaller but not statistically signicant (p= 0:56). At the individual level results show that in the
random treatment, 67% of buyers choose higher price under the specic investment than under the
general investment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p < 0:01).
Table 9 Dierential Eect of Investment on Price and Eort by Treatment
Coecients Price Eort
Specic x Main Treatment 10.495*** 0.632***
(2.129) (0.176 )
Specic x Low Benet Treatment 5.130*** 0.739***
(1.575) (0.239)
Specic x Random Treatment 8.974*** 0.599***
(2.749) (0.214)
Low Benet Treatment -0.133 -0.111
(2.887) (0.256)
Random Treatment -0.453 -0.581***
(2.325) (0.189)
Constant 13.649*** 1.039***
(1.525) (0.151)
Observations 1220 1220
Number of Subjects 122 122
OLS with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signicance is denoted: * p < 0:10
** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
5.3.2. Eort Hypothesis 3:a predicts that in the low benet treatment, overall eort is lower
than in the main treatment. In our data overall eort is 1:22 in the low benet treatment and
1:47 in the main treatment (p= 0:069) 23. When we restrict the data to accepted oers with price
greater or equal to 15, we do not nd statistical dierences with the main treatment. Average eort
is higher under the specic investment than under the general investment and at the individual
23When we look at trends across the treatments with b = 6, 12 and 18, the hypothesis-consistent result gets stronger.
A non parametric test for trends shows that expected eort presents a positive trend as b increases (p= 0:001).
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level we nd that 68% of suppliers choose higher eort under the specic investment than under
the general investment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p < 0:05).
In the random treatment, overall eort is signicantly lower than in the main treatment (0:79
vs. 1:47, p= 0:0001), as predicted by Hypothesis 4:a. Furthermore, a regression of total eort on
treatment dummies (presented in Table 23 in the Appendix) shows that the random treatment has
a negative eect on overall eort relative to the main treatment ( = 0:673, p < 0:001). Hypothesis
4:b predicts that the dierence in eort across investments is smaller in the random treatment than
in the main treatment. The dierence in average eort levels was 0:561 in the random treatment,
versus 0:98 in the main treatment. While the dierence in average eort across treatments is not
signicant under the general investment, (0:807 for the main treatment and 0:479 for the random
treatment, p= 0:223), the dierence is signicant under the specic investment (1:783 and 1:040
respectively, p < 0:001). Additionally, if we consider only accepted oers with price greater or equal
to 15, we nd that in the random treatment there is no dierence across investments(while in the
main treatment the dierence was signicant). Individual level results show that in the random
treatment, 82% of suppliers choose higher eort under the specic investment than under the
general investment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p < 0:01).
In Table 10 we regress eort on price for the specic and general investments for each of the
additional treatments. The regression presented in Panel A has price as the independent variable
and the regression presented in Panel B has a price dummy (which is equal to 1 if the price is
greater or equal to 15 and zero otherwise) as the independent variable. Panel A shows that in the
low benet treatment, the eort-price correlation is higher under the specic investment than under
the general investment (as in the main treatment), however Panel B shows the contrary. In the
random treatment, the price-eort relationship is much smaller under the specic investment, and
the dierence between investments is smaller than in the main treatment. In Table 21 we present
a regression with the data from all three treatments pooled together. We nd that in both, the low
benet and random treatments, the dierence in coecients across investments is not signicant
(p= 0:428 and p= 0:974 respectively). The dierence in eort-price correlation across investments
for each treatment is also presented for dierent price quantiles. Table 11 shows the eort-price
correlation for price oers in the 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles. We nd that, while the dierence
across investments is statistically signicant in the 75th and 90th quantiles of the main treatment,
in the two additional treatments the dierence across investments is not signicant at any quantile.
This shows that while in the main treatment the specic investment led to signicantly more high
eort choices (corresponding to high price oers), there was not a corresponding dierence in the
eort distribution in the additional treatments.
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Table 10 Price - Eort Relationship - Additional Treatments
Panel A Panel B
Treatment Low Benet Random Low Benet Random
Coecients Eort Eort Eort Eort Eort Eort Eort Eort
(Specic) (General) (Specic) (General) (Specic) (General) (Specic) (General)
Price 0.094*** 0.058*** 0.048*** 0.039* 2.974*** 3.983*** 1.995*** 2.549
(0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.023) (0.629) (1.224) (0.601) (1.604)
Constant -0.961 0.677 -1.293** -1.054 -0.684 -1.233 -1.451** -2.177
(0.600) (0.665) (0.615) (1.025) (0.636) (1.240) (0.682) (1.639)
Observations 97 54 127 47 97 54 127 47
Nr. of Subjects 25 22 27 22 25 22 27 22
Panel A has price as the independent variable, Panel B has a price dummy (which is equal to 1 if the price is greater
or equal to 15 and zero otherwise) as the independent variable. Tobit regressions (accepted oers only) with subject
random eects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Signicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
Table 11 Price-Eort Quantile Regressions - Additional Treatments
Treatment Low Benet Random
Quantile 0:50 0:75 0:90 0:50 0:75 0:90
Coecients Eort Eort
Price x Specic 0.088*** 0.109*** 0.133*** 0.030** 0.077*** 0.075***
(0.027) (0.013) (0.030) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
Price x General 0.040 0.083*** 0.121*** 0.011 0 0.067
(0.030) (0.021) (0.031) (0.022) (0.053) (0.063)
Specic -1.088 -0.758 -0.273 0.0526 -1.769 -1.417
(0.918) (0.497) (0.618) (0.516) (1.293) (1.628)
Constant 1 1.667*** 1.939*** -0.053 2 2.667*
(0.840) (0.156) (0.504) (0.503) (1.234) (1.416)
Observations 151 151 151 174 174 174
Dierence in Price Slopes (Test Specic = General)
(p  value) 0.234 0.286 0.780 0.463 0.163 0.899
Total Investment Eects on Eort
Specic - General -0.124 0.144 0.333 0.442 0.538 -0.975
(p  value) 0.833 0.834 0.839 0.167 0.522 0.665
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signicance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01. Total
Investment Eects estimates the total dierence between investments given prices at the corresponding quantiles of
the price distribution.
5.3.3. Prots We next analyze the eect of the specic investment on total prots. Hypothesis
3:a predicts that total prots are lower in the low benet treatment relative to the main treatment,
and Hypothesis 4:a predicts that total prots are lower in the random treatment relative to the
main treatment. Average values are presented in Table 12. Average total prots in the low benet
and random treatments were 169:17 and 170:10, compared to the main treatment 174:63 (rank-
sum test: LB vs Main p > 0:20, Random vs Main p = 0:005)24. When we regress total prot
24A non parametric test for trends shows that total prot presents a positive trend as b increases (p value < 0:001)
for the treatments with b = 6, 12 and 18, providing support for Hypothesis 3.a.
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on treatment dummies (presented in Table 23 in the Appendix), we observe that both the low
benet and random treatments have signicant negative eects on total prot relative to the main
treatment (coecients: 5:46 with p < 0:001 and  4:53 with p = 0:003 respectively), consistent
with our hypotheses. Hypothesis 4:b predicts that the dierence in total prots across investments
is lower in the random treatment than in the main treatment. The dierence in average total prot
across investments is 0:69 in the random treatment and 7:63 in the main treatment. Additionally,
in Table 13 we regress prots on separate indicator variables for the specic investment for each
treatment, as well as treatment dummies. We nd that the eect of the specic investment on total
prot in the main treatment is greater than in the random treatment (p= 0:0992).
Similar results hold for buyers' prots. Average buyer prot is 92:24 in the low benet treatment
and 91:17 in the random treatment, both signicantly lower than the prot of 95:6 in the main
treatment (p = 0:03 and p = 0:005 respectively). The dierence in average buyer's prot across
the two investments is smaller in the random treatment than in the main treatment (0:67 in the
random treatment vs. 3:94 in the main treatment). We also nd that, at individual level, in the
low benet and random treatments a buyer does not make a signicantly higher prot under the
specic investment than under the general investment, as was the case in the main treatment
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p > 0:020 for both the low benet and random treatments).
Table 13 presents the interaction eects of the specic investment and treatment on prots.
While under the main treatment the specic investment leads to increased prots (both jointly
and individually), in the low benet treatment it consistently leads to lower prots. In the ran-
dom treatment we nd that there is no eect on prots from the specic investment. The strong
connection between the main treatment and the higher benets of the specic investment, support
the argument that it is the separating equilibrium which favors the prot premiums of the specic
investment.
5.3.4. Individual Dierences In the main treatment, we identied the mechanism driving
our results: a positive correlation between the supplier being more reciprocal and choosing the
specic investment more often. When we examine the subject-level behavior in the additional
treatments we nd that this mechanism is no longer present.
In the low benet treatment, we nd that there is still sorting - with some subjects choosing
the specic investment more often than others. Subjects who choose the specic investment more
often in the rst ve periods also choose it more often in the last ve periods, both as measured by
correlation (= 0:526, p < 0:05), and a non-parametric trend test(p= 0:007). Similarly, the permu-
tation test also indicates a signicantly larger number of subjects choosing the specic investment
frequently (p < 0:05 for frequencies greater than seven). However, we do not nd a dierence in
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Table 12 Prot Comparison - Additional Treatments
Average Average Average
Treatment Investment Supplier's Buyer's Total
Prot Prot Prot
Main Specic 80.23 96.88 177.11
General 76.54 92.94 169.48
Rank Sum test (p-value)* 0:97 0:02 0:99
Low Benet Specic 75.68 91.03 166.70
General 77.75 93.04 170.79
Rank Sum test (p-value)* 0:001 0:038 < 0:001
Random Specic 78.94 91.46 170.40
General 78.91 90.80 169.71
Rank Sum test (p-value)* 0.067 0:943 < 0:001
* Non-parametric test of dierence in average prots between general and specic investments.
Table 13 Interaction Eects of Specic Investment and Treatment on Prot
Coecients Suppliers' Prot Buyers' Prot Total Prot
Specic x Main Treatment 3.167** 4.863*** 5.357***
(1.346) (1.589) (1.680)
Specic x Low Benet Treatment -2.806* -1.170 -3.682**
(1.691) (1.440) (1.481)
Specic x Random Treatment -0.202 0.263 1.131
(1.960) (2.048) (1.937)
Low Benet Treatment 1.145 0.388 -0.387
(1.401) (2.116) (1.028)
Random Treatment 2.147 -1.296 -1.550
(1.443) (1.858) (1.059)
Constant 76.892*** 92.319*** 171.014***
(0.865) (1.072) (0.766)
Observations 1220 1220 1220
Nr. of Subjects 122 122 122
OLS regression with subject random eects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signicance is denoted:
* p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
supply chain game play between subjects who choose the specic investment ve or more times and
subjects who choose it four of fewer times.25 In Table 14 we regress eort on price (with the specic
investment) separately for these two groups. Unlike the main treatment, we nd very similar price
coecients for high- and low-frequency subjects. When we pool the data in one regression, the
dierence in coecients is not signicant (p= 0:904), as shown in Table 22 in the Appendix. Addi-
tionally, neither trust nor reciprocity in the trust game are correlated with choosing the specic
investment at least ve times in the low benet treatment (Table 24). Hypothesis 4:c. predicts that
25 The cuto point of ve was chosen so that the fraction of suppliers above and below the cuto point is the closest to
that in the main treatment, where the cuto point was eight. If we use the cuto points derived from the permutation
test, 6 (marginally signicant) or 7 (signicant), the results do not change.
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there is no relation between the specic investment and reciprocity in the random treatment. When
we compare the price-eort relationships of subjects that were assigned the specic investment six
times or more to those assigned it ve or fewer times, we nd that high-frequency subjects actually
have a lower price coecient than low-frequency subjects with only marginal signicant dierence
(p = 0:097 presented in Table 22) 26. Additionally, as predicted by Hypothesis 4:d, neither trust
nor reciprocity in the trust game are correlated with a high frequency of the specic investment
(see Table 24).
Table 14 Individual Specic Price-Eort Relationships Under Specic Investment - Additional Treatments
Coecients Low Benet Treatment Random Treatment
Eort Eort Eort Eort
(Specic < 5) (Specic 5+) (Specic < 6) (Specic 6+)
Price 0.086*** 0.096*** 0.077*** 0.036**
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014)
Constant -0.885 -0.979 -1.419 -1.546**
(0.792) (0.861) (1.044) (0.776)
Observations 31 66 49 78
Nr. of Subjects 13 12 13 14
Tobit regressions (accepted oers only) with subject random eects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Signif-
icance is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
These results explain why the specic investment is no longer more protable under the two
additional treatments. The fact that reciprocal suppliers do not consistently choose the specic
investment more often shows that the investment type is no longer a good predictor of reciprocity.
These results are particularly strong in the random treatment, providing support to the hypothesis
that the separating equilibrium is the main driver behind our results.
6. Repeated Interactions
In the previous sections, we have considered the eects of reciprocity and up-front buyer specic
investments on supply-chain eciency when rms interact only once. In this section we study the
impact of longer relationships on the sorting mechanism with a nitely repeated version of the
supply chain game. With repeated interactions, rms may be concerned about how their actions
in the current period aect the prots in subsequent periods.
The existing literature shows that repeated interactions have a positive impact on trust and
trustworthiness. Ozer et al. (2011) nd that repeated interactions further promote cooperation in
forecast information sharing. Empirical research by Doney and Cannon (1997) nd that concerns
26 The cuto point was set at those subjects who were assigned the specic investment six times or more so that the
fraction of subjects above and below the cuto point was close to that in the main treatment.
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about reputation reinforce trust and that developing trusting relationships represents an investment
for the long run. This suggests that repeated interactions could enhance the benets of buyer-
specic investments in presence of reciprocal suppliers that we observed in the previous sections.
In innitely repeated interactions it is a well-know game-theoretical result that, if players care
enough about the future, collaborative outcomes can be sustained in equilibrium. On the other
hand, in nitely repeated interactions these equilibria usually fall apart. Through backwards induc-
tion, players know that their counterpart will defect in the last period, so this breaks apart col-
laborations in previous periods. However, previous research has shown that outcomes that are not
equilibria of the single shot game can be equilibria of a nitely repeated game in certain circum-
stances, as in the case of incomplete information. For example, Kreps and Wilson (1982) show
that reputation building can be an equilibrium in a nitely repeated version of Selten's nitely
repeated chain-store game. Similarly, Kreps et al. (1982) show that reputation eects due to infor-
mational asymmetries can generate cooperative behavior in nitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,
where \nking" at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium of the nitely repeated game. We show
that the existence of reciprocal suppliers (and asymmetric information about the suppliers' type)
allows for collaborative outcomes to arise in a nitely repeated game.
6.1. Model and Experimental Design
We extended the previous model to the case where, after the supplier chooses an investment, the
buyer and the supplier engage in a nite number of repeated transactions (\periods"). We rst
characterize a separating equilibrium, analogous to the one described in the one-period model.
Under this equilibrium, the buyer oers a reciprocal contract under the specic investment and a
null contract under the general investment in each transaction. The reciprocal supplier chooses the
specic investment, then the buyer oers a reciprocal contract to which the supplier reciprocates
by exerting eort erb . Likewise, the selsh supplier chooses the general investment and is oered
a null contract, which the supplier rejects. The sucient condition for the separating equilibrium
in a one-transaction game also guarantees a separating equilibrium in the nitely repeated game.
This result is summarized in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. In a nitely repeated interaction game; there exists a separating equilibrium that
is the same as in Theorem (2).
We also characterize another equilibrium which leads to collaborative outcomes denoted \semi-
separating". In this equilibrium, both types of supplier choose the buyer-specic investment, and
are oered a reciprocal contract in each transaction. Both suppliers exert reciprocal eort erb for
the rst N   1 transactions. In the last transaction, the reciprocal supplier exerts eort erb and
the selsh supplier exerts zero eort. We summarize this result in Theorem 5:
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Theorem 5. In a nitely repeated game, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium under which
both suppliers choose the specic investment, and the buyer oers a reciprocal contract Rb in every
period. Upon receiving the contract, the reciprocal supplier exerts eort erb = c
0 1(b) for all
periods, and the selsh supplier exerts the same eort except in period n in which he exerts zero
eort.
The detailed description of the model and the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
We conduct a repeated interactions treatment in which subjects played six rounds of a repeated
version of the supply chain game. In the repeated version of the game, the supplier makes one
investment decision which is followed by three transactions. In each transaction, the buyer oers a
price and the supplier decides whether he accepts the oer and, if so, a quality level. The values of
the parameters are the same as those of the main treatment; b = 12, ub = 0 for the buyer-specic
investment, and g = 3, ug = 15 for the general investment. Suppliers start the each game with 60
points and buyers with 100 points. The supplier's and buyer's payos from the game are given by
their initial endowments plus the sum of their payos from all three transactions. At the end of
the experiment, one of the six rounds of the repeated supply chain game is randomly selected for
payment.
Based on our theoretical ndings, we expect the relationships to be more collaborative under the
specic investment. To see why, note that while the separating equilibrium predicts that the out-
come of each transaction will be as in the single-transaction case, the semi-separating equilibrium
predicts even more collaborative relationships under the specic investment (since selsh suppliers
also choose the specic investment and provide high eort for at least some of the transactions).
Our theoretical ndings also suggest that repeated interactions should accentuate the social sur-
plus of a specic investment in the presence of reciprocity relative to the single-transaction case.
Both equilibria predict that overall eort and total surplus27 should be at least as high as in the
main treatment. The separating equilibrium predicts in each transaction the same overall eort and
total surplus as in the separating equilibrium of the single-transaction game. The semi-separating
equilibrium predicts eort erb in periods 1 through N   1 and erb in period N . Additionally,
it predicts a total surplus of be
r
b   c(erb ) in periods 1 though N   1 and [berb   c(erb )] in
period N . Note that if Hypothesis 1 is true, and be
r
b   c(erb )> ug, then the total surplus in every
transaction period 1 through N   1 in repeated interactions should be at least as high as in the
main treatment. In the last period, the separating equilibrium predicts the same total surplus, and
the semi-pooling predicts a lower total surplus than in the main treatment. We summarize these
predictions in Hypothesis 5:
27We dene \surplus in transaction i" as the net prot a subject gets from that particular transaction (it does not
include the initial endowment).
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HYPOTHESIS 5. [Repeated Interactions Treatment]
The relationship between supplier and buyer is more collaborative under the buyer-specic invest-
ment.
5.a - Buyers oer higher prices, suppliers accept oers more often and exert higher eort under
the specic investment. Buyers' prots and total prots are higher under the specic investment
than under the general investment.
5.b - In each transaction, expected overall eort is at least as high as in the main treatment.
Expected total surplus is at least as high as in the main treatment in every transaction except in
the last one, where it can be higher or lower than in the main treatment.
6.2. Experimental Results
We conducted ve sessions of the repeated interactions treatment, with a total of 50 subjects. Total
payos from the experiment include the payo from the Supply Chain Game, the payos from the
two additional tasks and a $7 participation fee. The average payo was $15 and each session lasted
approximately 90 minutes.
As predicted by Hypothesis 5:a, Table 15 shows that average price, acceptance rate, and eort
are higher under the specic investment than under the general investment in all three periods,
and the dierences are signicant. Table 17 shows that the eort-price correlation is also higher
under the specic investment in every transaction. Buyers make higher prots28 when the buyer-
specic investment is chosen than when the general investment is chosen (Table 16, Rank-sum test
p-value: < 0:0001). This is the result of a higher surplus in every transaction (see Table 15). Table
16 shows that total prots are also signicantly higher under the specic investment, as predicted
by Hypothesis 5:a. This result is conrmed by the regression of buyers' prots and total prots on
a specic investment indicator variable presented in Table 25 in the Appendix.
Hypothesis 5:b predicts that in each transaction, expected overall eort is at least as high as in
the main treatment and that expected total surplus is at least as high as in the main treatment
in every transaction except in the last one, where it can be higher or lower than in the main
treatment. Total eort is 1:466 in the main treatment and 3:2 and 2:733 in transactions 1 and 2
of the repeated interactions treatment respectively (both dierences are signicant, p < 0:001). In
transaction 3, the dierence with the main treatment is not signicant (1:593, p= 0:182). Similarly,
total surplus is 14:628 in the main treatment and 27:813 and 24:48 in transaction 1 and 2 of
the repeated interactions treatment respectively (both dierences have p < 0:001). In transaction
28 Buyers' and suppliers' prots are dened as their initial endowment plus the sum of their surplus in all three
trading periods.
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3, total surplus is 16:577, which is not signicantly dierent from the total surplus in the main
treatment (p= 0:857).
Buyers' surplus under the specic investment in transactions 1 and 2 are signicantly higher than
in the main treatment (6:127 and 9:608 respectively versus  3:12, both with p < 0:001) and not
dierent in transaction 3 ( 4:77 versus  3:12, p= 0:214). While buyers' prots under the specic
investment increase relative to the main treatment, buyers' prots under the general investment
signicantly decrease relative to the main treatment. As a result, the dierence in buyers' prots
across the two investments increases in repeated interactions relative to the main treatment (47:211
versus 4:44). Similarly, the dierence in total prots across investments is signicantly larger under
the repeated interactions treatment than in the main treatment (58:25 in repeated interactions vs.
7:63 in the main treatment). We report that a further statistical analysis conrms these results
(c.f., Table 26 in the Appendix).
We nd two additional important results. First, there is strong evidence that the buyers' prot
under the buyer-specic investment is greater than the initial endowment of 100. That is, the
increase in buyers' surplus in transactions 1 and 2 more than compensates for the drop in trans-
action 3. We conduct a pair-wise comparison of each retailer's prot observation with a variable
that has all its values equal to 100, and reject the hypothesis that the two variables are equivalent
with p-value of 0:015. Additionally, we regress buyers' prot on a dummy variable for the buyer-
specic investment (the results are presented on Table 25 in the Appendix). A 95% condence
interval for buyers' prot under the specic investment is [100:97; 120:22]. Therefore at = 0:05, it
conrms that buyers' prots are greater than 100. This result stresses the impact of buyer-specic
investments on buyers' prots in repeated interactions. Buyers can expect to make positive prots
even in a context of non-contractible quality. Second, we observe that both price and eort do not
drop entirely in the third (last) transaction. In fact, both price and eort remain relatively high
under the specic investment (average price is 31:569 and average eort is 3:139). Similarly, Table
17 shows that the eort-price correlation is higher under the specic investment than under the
general investment and the dierence is even higher than in previous periods. These results provide
support for the existence of a fairly high number of reciprocal suppliers, which is a requirement for
the semi-separating equilibrium to arise.
7. Discussion
The experimental results largely conrm our hypotheses based on a signaling model. First, we
show that the upfront choice of a specic investment results in a more collaborative relationship
between buyers and suppliers. Buyers oer higher prices, suppliers accept oers more often, the
overall provision of eort is higher, and this results in higher total prots. We show that this is
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Table 15 Average Price, Acceptance, Eort, and Surplus
Investment Transaction 1 Transaction 2 Transaction 3
Price General 20:708 18:167 10:958
(all oers) Specic 42:863 33:020 31:569
Price General 38:541 35:818 36:546
(accepted oers) Specic 45:021 37:798 44:431
Acceptance General 0:5 0:458 0:229
Specic 0:951 0:873 0:706
Eort General 2:667 2:182 1:182
(accepted oers) Specic 4:289 4:067 3:139
Supplier's Surplus General 24:083 22:125 19:302
Specic 30:627 22:294 23:627
Buyer's Surplus General  15:271  13:427  7:562
Specic 6:127 9:608  4:774
Note: Surplus refers to the net prot from a transactions and does not include the initial endowment. Signicant
dierences across investments is denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
Table 16 Prot Comparison - Main vs. Repeated Interactions
Treatment Main Repeated Interactions
Average Average Average Average Average Average
Investment Supplier's Buyer's Total Supplier's Buyer's Total
Prot Prot Prot Prot Prot Prot
Specic 80.23 96.88 177.11 136.549 110.961 247.51
General 76.54 92.94 169.48 125.510 63.75 189.26
Rank Sum test (p-value)* 0.97 0.02 0.996 0:024 < 0:0001 < 0:0001
* Non-parametric test of dierence in average prots between general and specic investments. Note: Prots include
initial endowment.
Table 17 Price - Eort Relationship - Repeated Interactions
Coecients Transaction 1 Transaction 2 Transaction 3
Eort Eort Eort Eort Eort Eort
Specic General Specic General Specic General
Price 0.091*** 0.051** 0.108*** 0.078** 0.080*** -0.051
(0.008) (0.025) (0.006) (0.036) (0.014) (0.071)
Constant -0.360 0.540 -0.223 -1.619 -1.546 1.243
(0.566) (1.110) (0.322) (1.701) (0.969) (2.671)
Observations 97 24 89 22 72 11
Nr. of Subjects 24 15 22 12 21 10
Tobit regressions (accepted oers only) with subject random eects, except in column 6 which has 11 observations and
10 subjects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signicance is
denoted: * p < 0:10 ** p < 0:05 *** p < 0:01.
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possible because there exists a positive correlation between choosing the specic investment and
the supplier being reciprocal. Therefore, the investment choice can help buyers identify reciprocal
suppliers before contracting. We also nd that when the specic investment is not ecient enough,
the positive correlation between investment choice and reciprocity falls apart resulting in lower
levels of eort and total surplus. When suppliers are randomly assigned an investment, the eciency
premium of the specic investment disappears. This supports the hypothesis that it is the signaling
eect of the investment choice what drives the specic investments eciency enhancement. Finally,
we show that repeated interactions magnify the benets of the specic investment, leading to even
more collaborative relationships. This could be either attributed to a scenario where reciprocal
suppliers choose the specic investment and selsh suppliers choose the general investment, or a
scenario where both types of suppliers choose the specic investment and selsh suppliers mimic
reciprocal suppliers for some number of periods.
One result not anticipated by our theoretical model is the importance of trust for both buyers
and suppliers. In our model, we account for the supplier's reciprocity and this is sucient for
the separating equilibrium to arise. The experimental data (presented in Table 7) shows that,
suppliers must trust that buyers actually play the equilibrium and respond to their investment
choice with high prices. Similarly, buyers must trust that suppliers will reciprocate high prices with
high eort. By contrast, the supplier's eort choice, which has no subsequent buyer action, does
not depend on trust since this choice does not make the supplier vulnerable. Since trust plays a role
in subjects' decision making, a related consideration is whether subjects' decisions are inuence
by \betrayal aversion". Previous research on the trust game suggests that people may be averse to
being betrayed (Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004). In order to analyze this, we identify as a \betrayal"
the case where a buyer oered a positive price and received zero eort. We nd that the price oers
in periods 6 to 10 are not correlated with the number of betrayals experienced in the rst ve
periods. On the other hand, we nd that a betrayal in the period immediate previous to the current
one has a marginally signicant negative eect on buyers' price oers ( = 3:461, p= 0:066). This
further suggest that in practice buyers have some wariness about whether suppliers will in fact be
trustworthy.
Another surprising result is the increase in supplier's monetary prots under the specic invest-
ment. While our theoretical model predicts that reciprocal suppliers will have higher utility under
the specic investment, this is predicted to be entirely due to the non-monetary reciprocal utility. It
is possible that the strategic uncertainty (and therefore the importance of trust) kept some selsh
subjects from switching to the specic investment despite the monetary benets.
Finally, subjects' decisions in the game could be aected other interpersonal concerns such as
inequality aversion. If they perceive that their previous payo was too low (or too high) compared
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to their partners' payo, they may want to adjust their behavior in the following period to make
payos more equitable. This could happen even if subjects play with dierent subjects in every
round. To analyze this, we tested whether rms' prot premium (over their partner's prot) earned
in the previous period aected their decision in the current period. For buyers, we nd that price
oers were not aected by prot inequality in the previous period. For suppliers, we nd that
the choice of eort is negatively correlated with his prot premium in the previous period. This
suggests the opposite of inequality aversion: the more suppliers have earned over their partners
in the previous period, the lower the eort they provide in the current period (which will further
increase inequality). These results suggest that inequality aversion does not play an important role
in this context.
8. Conclusion
We investigate how rms can benet from identifying trustworthy suppliers when non-contractible
factors such as quality are important. We suggest that upfront relationship-specic investments
can signal that a supplier is trustworthy and will provide high quality if awarded a high price
contract. This provides an explanation to why certain suppliers want to make a buyer-specic
investment before contracting. We identify theoretical conditions where this signaling mechanism
can generate a separating equilibrium with selsh suppliers choosing a general investment (that
improves the supplier's outside option), while trustworthy suppliers choose the specic investment
(that increases the eciency of the supplier's quality-generating eort).
We test our model using a laboratory experiment. The results of our supply chain game conrm
the eect of signaling on supply chain performance. Subjects who consistently choose the specic
investment are signicantly more trustworthy as suppliers. As a result, contracting with suppliers
who made the relationship-specic investment leads to higher buyer prots and supply chain prots.
Oering a price premium to suppliers who chose the specic investment leads to higher quality,
as well as higher prots for the supply chain and both individual rms. Thus, buying rms facing
a supplier who made an up-front specic investment should consider oering generous contracts
even when quality is non-contractible. Our model determines that for the signaling mechanism
to arise, the buyer-specic investment needs to be ecient enough and the general investment
must provide sucient monetary incentives to the selsh supplier. The experimental results show
that, when these conditions are not present and the signaling mechanism is reduced or eliminated,
the relation between the specic investment and reciprocity is no longer present. As a result, the
relationship-specic investment no longer leads to higher prots.
Finally, we show that the benets of upfront buyer-specic investments in promoting collabo-
ration and increasing prots are further strengthened with repeated interactions. We characterize
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two possible equilibria: one where trustworthy supplier fully separate from the selsh suppliers, and
one where selsh suppliers mimic the investment choice and initial eort decisions of the reciprocal
suppliers. In both cases repeated interactions only increase the transaction surplus when there are
suciently many reciprocal rms. Our experimental results conrm this intuition: supply chain
prots are substantially increased with repeated transactions, and buyers benet heavily from
working with trustworthy suppliers.
Taken together our results show that there is great value in a buyer being able to identify a
trustworthy supplier, and suggest one potential avenue for trustworthy suppliers to distinguish
themselves. Future research can explore other ways that trustworthy suppliers can identify them-
selves, and other supply chain settings where this signaling is important.
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Supplementary Documents
1. Proofs for the Theoretical Results
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is algebraic, therefore omitted.
Proof of Lemma 2: Notice from Lemma 1 that offering a null contract to the selfish supplier is
optimal. This is because, regardless of the contract, the selfish supplier will either reject the offer
or exert zero effort. For the reciprocal supplier, notice also from Lemma 1 that, if p≥ γ + u¯i, the
reciprocal supplier accepts the offer and exerts er∗(p, i) = c′−1(αiφ). If u¯i < p≤ γ + u¯i, he accepts
the offer and exerts zero effort. If p ≤ u¯i, he rejects the buyer’s offer and earns ui. Thus, if the
buyer makes an offer p, such that p ≥ γ + u¯i, he will earn αie
r∗
i − p and if his offer is such that
p < γ+ u¯i, he earns zero profit. From equation 3, the minimum price that yields an effort level of
er∗(p, i) = c′−1(αiφ) is Ri = u¯i+γ. If αie
r∗
i − u¯i− γ ≥ 0, doing so results in a strictly positive payoff
for the buyer, therefore, it is optimal. Otherwise, offering the null contract is optimal.
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof utilizes Lemma 1 and 2 and derives the optimal contract for
both selfish and reciprocal suppliers.
Proof of Theorem 2: To show sufficiency, first notice that condition i), u¯g ≥ u¯b+ γ, guarantees
that the selfish supplier chooses the general investment as his profit with the general investment
is greater than the profit he earns when he mimics the reciprocal supplier and chooses the specific
investment. Likewise, condition ii, (1 − φ)(u¯b + γ) − c(e
r∗
b ) + φαbe
r∗
b ≥ u¯g, guarantees that the
reciprocal supplier chooses the specific investment. Conditions i) and ii) together imply condition
Cb, thus it is optimal for the buyer to offer a contract Rb to the reciprocal supplier when he chooses
the buyer-specific investment.
To show necessity, we show that the separating equilibrium breaks apart when any of condi-
tions (i)-(iii) does not hold. If condition i) is not met, both types of suppliers choose the specific
investment. If condition ii) does not hold, both types of suppliers choose the general investment.
If condition iii) does not hold, the set of parameters under which the separating equilibrium exists
becomes empty.
Proof of Theorem 3:
We show that the three pooling equilibria described in Theorem 3 exist and survive the intuitive
criterion. We focus on the beliefs that give greater disincentive for deviation, except in the case
1
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where it violates the intuitive criterion. In this case, we consider alternative beliefs. Together, they
characterize the full set of parameters under which the equilibrium can be supported with some
beliefs.
We first prove the equilibrium described in part a) – both suppliers choose the buyer-specific
investment and both suppliers accept the buyer’s reciprocal contract Rb– exists and survives the
intuitive criterion. Under this equilibrium, the selfish supplier exerts no effort, and the reciprocal
supplier exerts er
∗
b = c
′−1(αbφ) > 0. We will show that this equilibrium arises if (i) θ ≥ θ˜b, with
θ˜b =
u¯b+γ
αb(c
′−1(αbφ))
; (ii) u¯g < u¯b+ γ; and (iii) u¯g < (1−φ)(u¯b+ γ)− c(e
r∗
b )+φαbe
r∗
b .
Note that this equilibrium cannot exist when θ < θ˜b. This is because the selfish supplier will
exert no effort regardless of the contract. Hence, at low θ, the buyer finds it better off to deviate
and offer a null contract. We now show that this equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion with
two sets of beliefs: (1) θ(r|b) = θ and θ(r|g) = 0 and (2) θ(r|b) = θ and θ(r|g) = 1.
Suppose first that θ(r|b) = θ and θ(r|g) = 0. Condition (i) implies condition Cb (in equation (5)).
Hence, from Lemma 2, it is optimal for the buyer to offer a reciprocal contract, Rb under the
buyer-specific investment. Note that under these beliefs, it is optimal for the buyer to offer the
null contract under the general investment. Both suppliers choose the buyer-specific investment,
and both suppliers accept the reciprocal contract Rb. The selfish supplier exerts no effort and
the reciprocal supplier exerts effort er
∗
b = c
′−1(αbφ)> 0. The selfish supplier gets price u¯b+ γ and
exerts zero effort under the specific investment and gets u¯g under the general investment. Condition
(ii), u¯g < u¯b + γ, makes choosing the specific investment incentive compatible and rational for
the selfish supplier. The reciprocal supplier gets price u¯b + γ and chooses effort e
r∗
b under the
specific investment. Thus, he derives utility (1− φ)(u¯b + γ) − c(e
r∗
b ) + φαbe
r∗
b under the specific
investment and u¯g under the general investment. Condition (iii), u¯g < (1− φ)(u¯b + γ)− c(e
r∗
b ) +
φαbe
r∗
b , guarantees that choosing the specific investment is incentive compatible and rational for
the reciprocal supplier.
To show that this equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion, we need to consider two cases
separately depending on whether condition Cg is met or not (Note that Cb already holds if θ≥ θ˜b).
Suppose Cg holds. Note that the intuitive criterion is violated if a deviating strategy is equilibrium-
dominated 1 for the selfish supplier (i.e., u¯b+ γ > u¯g + γ) but not for the reciprocal supplier (i.e.,
(1−φ)(u¯b+ γ)− c(e
r∗
b )+φαbe
r∗
b ≤ (1−φ)(u¯g + γ)− c(e
r∗
g )+φαge
r∗
g )
2. However the first inequality
1 For the intuitive criterion a deviating strategy is defined as equilibrium-dominated if it gives the player a lower
payoff than his equilibrium payoff for any belief the uninformed party may have following deviation.
2We set these conditions using the highest off-equilibrium payoffs a supplier can earn under any belief. By doing this,
we ensure that the equilibrium refinement by intuitive criterion is robust even under the highest possible incentives
to deviate from equilibrium.
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cannot hold for any γ > 0 since u¯g ≥ u¯b. Thus, the equilibrium in part a) survives the intuitive
criterion.
Now suppose that condition Cg does not hold. Thus, it is optimal for the buyer to offer a
null contract to a reciprocal supplier when he makes the general investment. Again, the intuitive
criterion is violated when the deviating strategy is equilibrium-dominated for the selfish supplier
(i.e., u¯b + γ > u¯g) but not for the reciprocal supplier (i.e., (1− φ)(u¯b+ γ)− c(e
r∗
b ) + φαbe
r∗
b ≤ u¯g).
But, this violates condition (iii). Thus, the equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion.
A similar reasoning can be applied to show that the same equilibrium with belief θ(r|b) = θ and
θ(r|g) = 1 also survives the intuitive criterion if (1− φ)(u¯b + γ)− c(e
r∗
b ) + φαbe
r∗
b ≤ (1− φ)(u¯g +
γ)− c(er
∗
g ) + φαge
r∗
g . Likewise, we can show the pooling equilibrium described in part b) arises if
(i) θ ≥ θ˜g; (ii) u¯b ≤ (1− φ)(u¯g + γ)− c(e
r∗
g ) + φαge
r∗
g ; and (iii) (1− φ)(u¯g + γ)− c(e
r∗
g ) + φαge
r∗
g >
(1 − φ)(u¯b + γ) − c(e
r∗
b ) + φαbe
r∗
b , and the equilibrium described in part c) arises if (i) θ < θ˜g;
(ii)u¯g > u¯b + γ ; and (iii) u¯g > (1− φ)(u¯b + γ)− c(e
r∗
b ) + φαbe
r∗
b . The proof follows a similar logic,
thus it is omitted.
Theoretical Model for Random Investment Case:
Consider a game where nature moves first to assign investment randomly, the buyer acts second
to offer a take-it-or-leave-it price offer, and the supplier acts last and decides if he should accept
the offer, and, if so, selects an effort level. Because the investment is randomly chosen, the buyer
does not update his prior belief about the probability of the supplier being reciprocal, θ, after
observing the investment. Analogous to the result found in the pooling equilibrium case, there
exists a threshold θ˜i =
u¯i+γ
αic
′−1(αiφ)
for i= b, g (with θ˜g ≥ θ˜b) above which the buyer offers a reciprocal
contract or offers a null contract instead. When he is offered a reciprocal contract, the selfish
supplier accepts and chooses e = 0 and when he is offered a null contract he rejects the offer.
The reciprocal supplier accepts a reciprocal contract and chooses er∗i = c
′−1(αiφ) and rejects a null
contract.
One of the following three outcomes arises:
1) If θ ≥ θ˜b and θ ≥ θ˜g, the buyer offers a reciprocal contract Rb under the specific investment
and a reciprocal contract Rb under the general investment. With probability θ, the supplier will
be reciprocal and will choose effort er∗i and with probability (1− θ) the supplier will be selfish and
choose e= 0. Under the specific investment, the reciprocal supplier earns u¯b+γ− c(c
′−1(αbφ)) and
the selfish supplier earns u¯b + γ. The buyer’s expected profit is θ[αbc
′−1(αbφ) − (u¯b + γ)] + (1−
θ)[−(u¯b+γ)]. Under the general investment, the reciprocal supplier earns u¯g+γ− c(c
′−1(αgφ)) and
the selfish supplier earns u¯g + γ. The buyer’s expected profit is θ[αgc
′−1(αgφ)− (u¯g + γ)] + (1−
θ)[−(u¯g+ γ)].
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2) If θ ≥ θ˜b and θ < θ˜g, the buyer offers a reciprocal contract under the specific investment
p= u¯b + γ and a null contract under the general investment. Under the general investment both
types of supplier reject the offer. Under the specific investment, with probability θ the supplier is
reciprocal and chooses effort er∗b and with probability (1− θ) the supplier is selfish and chooses
e= 0. Under the general investment both types of supplier earn u¯g and the buyer earns zero profits.
Under the specific investment, the reciprocal supplier earns u¯b + γ − c(c
′−1(αbφ)) and the selfish
supplier earns u¯b+ γ. The buyer earns θ[αbc
′−1(αbφ)− (u¯b+ γ)]+ (1− θ)[−(u¯b+ γ)].
3) If θ < θ˜b and θ < θ˜g, the buyer offers a null contract under both investments. Thus, both types
of supplier reject the offer. The supplier earns u¯b under the specific investment and u¯g under the
general investment. The buyer earns zero profits under both investments.
Repeated Interactions Model:
We analyze a repeated interactions model in which the supplier first makes the investment deci-
sion and then the supplier and the retailer engage in N transactions. In each round of transaction,
the buyer makes an offer and the supplier decides whether he accepts the offer and, if so, how much
effort to make.
The buyer’s utility is the sum of profits over N periods:
UB(p|e, i) =
N∑
t=1
{
αiet− pt if the supplier accepts the offer in period t and exerts an effort level et
0 if the supplier rejects the offer in period t.
(1)
The selfish supplier’s utility is the total profit accrued:
U s(e|i, p) =
N∑
t=1
[pt− c(et)]. (2)
The reciprocal supplier’s utility is the sum of her utilities for the N periods 3:
U r(e|i, p) =
N∑
t=1
{
[pt− c(et)] if pt < γ+ u¯i
[(1−φ)(pt− c(et))+φ(αiet− c(et))] if pt ≥ γ+ u¯i
(3)
=
N∑
t=1
1{pt<γ+u¯i})[pt− c(et)]+ (1−1{pt<γ+u¯i})[(1−φ)(pt− c(et))+φ(αiet− c(et))]
We first show that the same separating equilibrium where the reciprocal supplier chooses the
specific investment and the selfish supplier chooses the general investment, exists in a finitely
repeated game as well. Furthermore, a sufficient condition is exactly the same as that in the
single period game (Theorem 2). In this equilibrium, the buyer always offers a reciprocal contract
3We assume that the supplier’s reciprocity concerns depend only on the latest offer received. It is not affected by
offers received in previous transaction periods.
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to a supplier who chose the specific investment, the reciprocal supplier accepts and exerts effort
er∗b = c
′−1(αbφ). On the other hand, the buyer offers a null contract to a supplier who chose a
general investment, which the selfish supplier rejects. This result is formalized in Theorem 4, which
stipulates that in a finitely repeated interaction game; there exists a separating equilibrium that
is the same as in Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 4: We will show that the sufficient conditions for a separating equilibrium to
arise in the single period case, i)u¯g ≥ u¯b+ γ and ii)(1− φ)(u¯b+ γ)− c(e
r∗
b )+αbφe
r∗
b ≥ u¯g, are also
sufficient for the separating equilibrium to arise in N-period games.
Condition i) guarantees that the selfish supplier does not want to deviate from the equilibrium.
To see why, consider first the case where the selfish supplier chooses the general investment. In
this case, the buyer believes that the supplier is selfish and offers a null contract in every period.
Thus, the selfish supplier rejects the contract in every period and earns a total profit of Nu¯g .
Consider now the case where the selfish supplier deviates and chooses the specific investment. We
show that one of the following two strategies will dominate any other strategy. The first strategy is
to exert effort er∗b for the first N − 1 periods and exert effort e= 0 in period N. This strategy will
result in a profit of (N−1)[u¯b+γ−c(e
r∗
b )]+ u¯b+γ. The other strategy is to exert effort e= 0 in the
first period and then reject the contract throughout, which results in a profit of u¯b+γ+(N −1)u¯b.
To show this, note first that in any period the supplier’s optimal effort is always one of the following
two: e= 0 or er∗b = c
′−1(αbφ). This is because any other effort leads the buyer to believe that the
supplier is selfish and offer him a null contract, so the supplier prefers e = 0. If c(er∗b ) > γ, then
e= 0 is optimal in every period. We show this by backward induction. In the last period the selfish
supplier always chooses e= 0. In period N − 1, choosing e= 0 has no cost and results in a profit
of u¯b in the following period. On the other hand, choosing e
r∗
b has a cost of c(e
r∗
b ) but earns him
u¯b+γ in the following period. Thus, if c(e
r∗
b )> γ, the supplier chooses e=0. The same logic applies
to every period prior to N − 1 (all the way up to period 1), so the supplier chooses e= 0 in every
period. This strategy earns the supplier a total profit of u¯b+γ+(N − 1)u¯b which, under condition
i), is dominated by his payoff under the general investment. If c(er∗b )≤ γ, exerting effort e
r∗
b for the
first N −1 periods and e= 0 in period N, dominates any other strategy. To see why, note first that
in period N the selfish supplier always chooses e= 0. In periods 1 through N − 1 exerting effort
er∗b has cost c(e
r∗
b ) earns the supplier u¯b+ γ in the following period, and choosing e= has no cost
but earns the supplier u¯b in the following period. Thus, if c(e
r∗
b )≤ γ, the supplier chooses e
r∗
b in
periods 1 to N − 1. In this case, the supplier earns (N − 1)[u¯b+ γ − c(e
r∗
b )] + u¯b+ γ which, under
condition i), is dominated by his payoff under the general investment.
Now we show that the reciprocal supplier does not want to deviate from the equilibrium. Consider
first the case where the reciprocal supplier chooses the specific investment. In every period, the
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optimal effort is either er∗b or e = 0. If in any period, the supplier chooses anything other than
er∗b , then in every subsequent period she will be offered a null contract, which she rejects and gets
utility u¯b. If the supplier is offered a reciprocal contract and exerts effort e
r∗
b , then she gets utility
(1− φ)(u¯b + γ)− c(e
r∗
b ) + αbφe
r∗
b in that period and is offered a reciprocal contract again in the
following period. Thus, if conditions i) and ii) hold, it is optimal for the supplier to exert effort
er∗b in every period, which gets her a total utility of N [(1− φ)(u¯b + γ)− c(e
r∗
b ) + αbφe
r∗
b ]. To see
why, we solve by backward induction. In the last period, the utility from exerting effort er∗b is
(1− φ)(u¯b+ γ)− c(e
r∗
b ) +αbφe
r∗
b and the utility from e= 0 is u¯b+ γ. Thus, if conditions i) and ii)
are met, the optimal effort is er∗b . In period N − 1, if the supplier exerts effort e
r∗
b , then she gets
utility (1−φ)(u¯b+γ)− c(e
r∗
b )+αbφe
r∗
b in periods N −1 and N . If she chooses e= 0, she gets u¯b+γ
in period N −1 and u¯b in period N . Thus, if conditions i) and ii) are met, the optimal effort is e
r∗
b .
If we continue solving backwards until period 1, the same logic shows that, if conditions i) and ii)
are met, the optimal effort is er∗b in every period.
Consider now the case where the reciprocal supplier chooses the general investment. The supplier
is offered a null contract in every period and she rejects the offer in every period. Thus, she derives
utility Nu¯g. Condition ii) guarantees that the utility she derives from the equilibrium payoff,
N [(1−φ)(u¯b+ γ)− c(e
r∗
b )+αbφe
r∗
b ], is greater or equal than Nu¯g.
Lastly, conditions i) and ii) guarantee that the buyer does not want to deviate from equilibrium
under the equilibrium beliefs. First, note that if a supplier chooses the general investment, the buyer
believes the supplier is selfish and it is optimal to offer a null contract in every period. If the supplier
chooses the specific investment, the buyer believes the supplier is reciprocal. Conditions i) and ii)
guarantee that it is optimal for the buyer to offer a reciprocal contract to a reciprocal supplier
in every period. To see why, note that conditions i) and ii) combined imply condition Cb, that is
αb(c
′−1(αbφ))− u¯−γ ≥ 0. If the buyer offers a reciprocal contract to a reciprocal supplier in any given
period, the reciprocal supplier will exert effort er∗b and the buyer gets profit αb(c
′−1(αbφ))− u¯b−γ.
If he offers a null contract, the reciprocal supplier will reject it and the buyer earns zero profit in
every period thereafter. Thus, if conditions i) and ii) hold, it is optimal for the buyer to offer a
reciprocal contract in every period. 
In a finitely repeated game we also find that an interesting equilibrium exists (we call it semi-
separating 4) which leads to collaborative outcomes in every period except for the last. Under this
equilibrium, both types of supplier choose the specific investment. The buyer offers a reciprocal
4We call this equilibrium a “semi-separating equilibrium” since the selfish and reciprocal suppliers make the same
investment choice and their actions coincide in all trading periods except for the last one. As a result, their actions
coincide at every point where their actions affecting the buyer’s beliefs has impact on the buyer’s future actions.
Their actions only differ in the last trading period, where they no longer affect the buyer’s actions.
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contract under the specific investment and a null contract under the general investment. The
reciprocal supplier chooses effort er∗b = c
′−1(αbφ) in every period, and the selfish supplier chooses
effort es∗b = c
′−1(αbφ) in every period, except the last period, where he accepts the offer and chooses
zero effort. This result is formalized in Theorem 5, which stipulates that in a finitely repeated
game, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium under which both suppliers choose the specific
investment, and the buyer offers a reciprocal contract Rb in every period. Upon receiving the
contract, the reciprocal supplier exerts effort er∗b = c
′−1(αbφ) for all periods, and the selfish supplier
exerts the same effort except in period n in which he exerts zero effort.
The semi-separating equilibrium exists if the buyer’s belief that the supplier is reciprocal, θ,
is high enough. In particular, it requires θ ≥ θ˜Nb . The threshold θ˜
N
b =
u¯b+γ
αbe
r∗
b
is also the threshold
above which a retailer offers a reciprocal contract in a pooling equilibrium of the single interaction
model. Additional conditions on the parameters are necessary to guarantee that the equilibrium is
incentive compatible and rational for all players. The proof is similar as in Theorem (4) and thus,
omitted.
2. Supplementary Tables
Table 18 Price Comparison - Main Treatment
Coefficients Price
Specific 11.29***
(1.507)
Constant 13.12***
(0.919)
Observations 670
Number of Subjects 67
OLS with subject random effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10
** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Table 19 Acceptance Decisions - Main Treatment
Coefficients Accept Accept (price≥ 15)
Specific 1.884*** 1.323***
(0.195) (0.441)
Price 0.107*** 0.012
(0.011) (0.013)
Constant -1.597*** 1.004**
(0.186) (0.454)
Observations 670 333
Number of Subjects 67 67
Probit regression with subject random effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: *
p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p< 0.01.
Table 20 Profit on Specific Investment Choice - Main Treatment
Coefficients Supplier’s Profit Buyer’s Profit Total Profit
Specific 3.215** 4.794*** 5.357***
(1.343) (1.579) (1.683)
Constant 76.860*** 92.366*** 171.014***
(0.863) (1.066) (0.767)
Observations 670 670 670
Number of Subjects 67 67 67
OLS with subject random effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10
** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Table 21 Price-Effort Relationship for Specific vs. General - All Treatments
Coefficients Effort Effort
(Accepted) (Accepted)
Price x Specific x Main Treatment 0.083*** 3.336***
(0.006) (0.348)
Price x General x Main Treatment 0.061*** 1.281
(0.017) (0.782)
Price x Specific x Low Benefit Treatment 0.094*** 2.964***
(0.015) (0.691)
Price x General x Low Benefit Treatment 0.052*** 4.236***
(0.017) (1.470)
Price x Specific x Random Treatment 0.048*** 2.129***
(0.010) (0.611)
Price x General x Random Treatment 0.041** 2.198
(0.020) (1.976)
Specific x Main Treatment -1.670*** -2.050***
(0.565) (0.752)
Specific x Low Benefit Treatment -1.652** 0.966
(0.775) (1.509)
Specific x Random Treatment 0.025 0.703
(0.804) (1.999)
Low Benefit Treatment 0.400 -2.456
(0.930) (1.629)
Random Treatment -1.393 -2.850
(1.012) (2.102)
Constant 0.153 0.618
(0.576) (0.736)
Observations 808 808
Nr. of Subjects 120 120
Test Price x Specific Often = Price x General Often p− value p− value
Main Treatment 0.19 0.017
Low Benefit Treatment 0.06 0.428
Random Treatment 0.74 0.974
Tobit regressions with subject random effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Column 1 has price as inde-
pendent variable and column 2 has a price dummy (which takes value one if the price is greater or equal to 15 and
zero otherwise) as independent variable. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p< 0.01.
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Table 22 Individual Specific Price-Effort Relationship Under Specific Investment - All Treatments
Coefficients Effort
(Accepted)
Price x Specific Often x Main Treatment 0.100***
(0.007)
Price x General Often x Main Treatment 0.048***
(0.009)
Price x Specific Often x Low Benefit Treatment 0.097***
(0.018)
Price x General Often x Low Benefit Treatment 0.093***
(0.026)
Price x Specific Often x Random Treatment 0.034***
(0.012)
Price x General Often x Random Treatment 0.068***
(0.016)
Specific Often x Main Treatment -0.676
(0.642)
Specific Often x Low Benefit Treatment 0.035
(1.184)
Specific Often x Random Treatment -0.344
(1.050)
Low Benefit Treatment -0.210
(0.980)
Random Treatment -0.153
(0.901)
Constant -0.847*
(0.450)
Observations 621
Nr. of Subjects 117
Test Price x Specific Often = Price x General Often p− value
Main Treatment < 0.001
Low Benefit Treatment 0.904
Random Treatment 0.097
Tobit regressions with subject random effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Specific Often is a dummy
variable which takes value 1 if the supplier’s frequency of the specific investment is greater or equal to 8 (5 for the
low benefit treatment and 6 for the random treatment respectively). Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05
*** p< 0.01.
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Table 23 Effect of Treatment on Overall Effort and Total Profit
Coefficients Overall Effort Total Profit
Low Benefit Treatment -0.244 -5.461***
(0.274) (1.243)
Random Treatment -0.673*** -4.532***
(0.191) (1.537)
Constant 1.466*** 174.628***
(0.144) (1.093)
Observations 1220 1220
Number of Subjects 122 122
OLS with subject random effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10
** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
Table 24 Effect of Trust and Reciprocity on Investment Choice - Additional Treatments
Coefficients Main Treatment Low Benefit Treatment Random Treatment
Chose Specific 8+ Chose Specific 5+ Chose Specific 6+
High Trust 1.298*** -0.053 -0.271
(0.357) (0.482) (0.492)
High Reciprocity 0.630** -0.275 -0.097
(0.314) (0.492) (0.483)
Constant -1.044*** -0.508** -0.157 -0.074 0.157 0.097
(0.297) (0.219) (0.315) (0.304) (0.315) (0.348)
Observations 67 67 28 28 27 27
Nr. of Subjects 67 67 28 28 27 27
Probit regression. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Signifi-
cance is denoted: * p< 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p< 0.01.
Table 25 Total Profit on Specific Investment Choice - Repeated Interactions
Coefficients Supplier’s Profit Buyer’s Profit Total Profit
Specific 9.746 45.640*** 44.931***
(7.429) (12.067) (8.645)
Constant 126.389*** 64.818*** 198.317***
(5.267) (10.009) (3.883)
Observations 150 150 150
Number of Subjects 25 25 25
OLS with subject random effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10
** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Table 26 Repeated Interactions vs. Main Treatments: Effects of Specific Investment on Effort and Profits
Transaction Period 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Coefficients Overall Effort Buyers’ Profit Total Profit
Specific x MT 0.699*** 0.649*** 0.580*** 4.538*** 4.651*** 4.918*** 5.618*** 5.099*** 4.618***
(0.178) (0.177) (0.175) (1.535) (1.553) (1.601) (1.673) (1.692) (1.717)
Specific x RIT 2.216*** 2.020*** 1.342*** 20.867*** 22.681*** 1.789 25.260*** 20.073*** 3.826
(0.499) (0.577) (0.486) (5.564) (5.034) (4.274) (2.927) (3.895) (3.448)
RIT 0.699** 0.332 -0.394 -7.448** -5.645 0.835 -0.202 -0.358 2.464
(0.350) (0.360) (0.343) (3.611) (4.315) (3.502) (1.172) (1.897) (1.725)
Constant 0.994*** 1.028*** 1.075*** -7.461*** -7.538*** -7.718*** 10.838*** 11.188*** 11.513***
(0.150) (0.151) (0.153) (1.040) (1.050) (1.080) (0.735) (0.799) (0.862)
Observations 820 820 820 820 820 820 820 820 820
Nr. of Subjects 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Test: Specific x MT = Specific x RIT
(p− value) 0.004 0.023 0.140 0.005 0.001 0.493 ¡0.001 ¡0.001 0.837
OLS regression with subject random effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted:
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p< 0.01.
